Anticapture Commission

Hi @chaselb! Please keep in mind the commission is meant to be an experiment that only runs in Seasons 5 and Seasons 6.

The criteria to qualify to be a member of the Commission include a voting participation requirement but also the requirement to have received retroactive rewards, which include a broader set of parameters. Those include:

Voting in the Agora test vote
Voting in Reflection Periods
Nominating RetroPGF Projects
Having published voting rationale
Supporting Missions

In the future, this may also include delegates that receive RetroPGF under the governance category.

The reason we haven’t included participation metrics (like comments on forum posts, attendance of community calls, etc.) is because they are easily spammable and, in some cases, most also be tracked manually.

The list provided above is based on a snapshot as of the end of Season 4 but will need to be updated at the start of Season 5, and will again be updated at the end of Voting Cycle # 19 (mid-Season), so voting in this Reflection Period will impact the list of qualifying delegates, as will any changes in delegation rankings during this period. The membership is meant to be somewhat fluid as there are opportunities for membership to change at the start and mid-point of each Season.
cc @v3naru_Curia


The below response reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @kaereste and @Sinkas, and it’s based on the combined research, fact-checking and ideation of the two.

As the Optimism Collective grows, we believe establishing an anti-capture commission proactively is a great step towards the longevity of the values the DAO was founded on. We’re supportive of the initiative and we are inclined to vote in favour of the proposal.

However, we’re sceptical of the effectiveness such a commission would have with the amount of OP currently earmarked to be delegated to it upon its creation. We find that 10M OP is a relatively small amount, especially for a commission that is theoretically tasked with protecting the Collective from Governance Capture, given that:

  • The combined power of just some of the top delegates easily surpasses 10M (e.g. just Lindaxie and Polynya combined have >11M OP delegated to them).
  • The whole purpose of the commission is to prevent capture, which would only take place from stakeholders with significant amount of OP.

We’d suggest increasing the delegated amount by at least 3 times, to a total of 30M OP. Having said that, we believe it’s also important to clarify the circumstances under which the Anti Capture Commission would actually engage in voting. Our understanding is that they would only do so in case of a threat to the Collective’s governance — and not in regularly held votes for DAO matters.

Is that the case or are we missing something?


Thanks @kaereste!

I see where the misunderstanding is coming from. The primary purpose of the anticapture commission is that it is a group of the highest context Token House delegates tasked with alerting the Citizens’ House when there is an imbalance among tokenholders in the Token House and/or a veto should be considered. (Report templates here.)

The Citizens are likely to be focused on what is occuring in the Citizens’ House or RetroPGF rounds and may not have as much time to focus on dynamics in the Token House (and will certainly not have as much context about the Token House.) The Token House, being plutocratic, is more prone to imbalances of power. Therefore, the Commission plays the very important role of making sure the Citizens’ House can be an effective veto.

In other words, the intent is not to create a voting block that overpowers other voters in the Token House, but for the commission to alert the Citizens’ House, which is the ultimate check on the Token House, when a veto should be considered. If the Commission were delegated 30M OP, the Commission itself could become an avenue for capture.

We considered 10M OP a reasonable amount of delegation to start with given the experimental nature of this structure, aligned with the experimental delegation programs we’ve run in the past. The intention is that the Commission votes on all votes, to ensure the voices of our highest impact individual/professional delegates remain represented as we welcome OP Chains and other stakeholders with large amounts of voting power.

Does that make sense?


Thank you lavande. This last explanation of yours made sense to me. I was going to vote NO echoing what @GFXlabs mentioned above.

Would really love a bit more nice definition of what imbalances of power are and some examples, but I think this latest explanation from you makes it a bit more clear.

So I will vote yes for now.

Though I still think the OP governance is gettign quite complicated and beauraucratic with all these councils and commisions. And we should try to figure out a way to not get lost in beauraucracy.


Thank you lavande and all for the discussion - very clarifying.

We are planning to Abstain from this vote. We don’t feel strongly enough to vote in opposition of this effort and we tend to be supportive of well-scoped experiments that address specific concerns. However, we’re not sure that the experiment is well enough scoped nor do we fully understand the issue and the potential landscape of ideas that could address the issue.

“The primary purpose of the anticapture commission is that it is a group of the highest context Token House delegates tasked with alerting the Citizens’ House when there is an imbalance among tokenholders in the Token House and/or a veto should be considered.”

We are still not completely clear on what the core issue is - how has the imbalance of power created issues for the Citizens’ House in the past (regarding knowing when/how to exercise a veto or other issues)?

Also, is there a list of considered solutions that were considered and rationale for choosing this specific solution?

What’s the reasoning for the length of the trial period? What are metrics of success for this experiment? How do we measure success in relation to the additional time and effort that will go into it from delegates who opt in?


We vote FOR the introduction of the Anticapture Commission, but we wish to share some critical insights alongside the arguments presented by other delegates.

Part of this stems from the history of progression of the distribution of voting power among delegates since inception and the allocation of OP tokens across so many different purposes, which has not had the same impact on their use as a governance token. Although the distribution of OP tokens was implicity recognized since the allocation announcement, our observation is that votable supply haven’t seen much growth, except for specific reasons such as airdrops, delegation programs (1, 2 soon), top stakeholders, or certain expected allocations like Base. While this isn’t necessarily a shortcoming (as increased participation is always welcome), it prompts us to contemplate how to effectively promote the use of OP as a governance token in the most organic way for the wide range of stakeholders. The objective is to ensure comprehensive representation, a challenge that is both intricate and subjective.

As the SEED Latam delegation team, we appreciate the recognition given to the entire group of individuals mentioned as high impact individual delegates. We believe that, given the circumstances, it’s an experiment worth pursuing, but its outcome will hinge on the context set forth in Season 5. As @GFXlabs noted, justifying its existence beyond a reasonable scope can be a pitfall. We shouldn’t lose focus on the primary goal: to augment votable supply, for example, across initiatives such as Intent #4.

Ideally, the Anticapture Commission should prioritize communication and avoid being overly intrusive. We commend the vision of its primary role as a “bridge” for the Citizen House to take action, especially concerning vetoes as explained by @lavande. However, it’s imperative to define the metrics for gauging the success of this experiment, a sentiment echoed by @she256.

With all things considered, the introduction of the Anticapture Commission should be a net-positive for the Optimism governance. We remain hopeful of its positive impact.

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The below response reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @kaereste and @Sinkas, and it’s based on the combined research, fact-checking and ideation of the two.

We will vote FOR this proposal.

Although we have some doubts, which have also been expressed by other delegates in previous posts, we find this experiment to be an interesting initiative that might encourage the highest context delegates to become more active in shaping the future of the Optimism Collective.

As we are on the list of qualified delegates, we are already committing ourselves to active participation in the commission if it is approved.


Somehow completely missed that the commission will have 10M delegated to them, I don’t think I can change my vote but I wanted to also echo my agreement with @kaereste 's views on the delegation amount.

Rather than delegating 30M , were the Commission to be a successful experiment I would probably suggest a floating amount relative to the top ~10 delegates. This way, the amount remains proportional to how top-heavy the delegation voting supply is. If a big % of the supply is at the top, the commission gets to have high voting power to oversee top delegates, but if many delegates spread the voting power the delegation automatically self-limits itself.

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I am voting for this proposal. However, I believe a fixed number to be delegated is not the best approach. We should consider the voting power of the top 20 delegates and have a % given to the anticapture commission.


Thank you for the valuable feedback! We’ve made the below edits in an attempt to clarify without changing the meaning of any portion of the proposal. Happy to answer additional questions the next Token House community call.

Change log:

  • Changed “stakeholder” to “tokenholder” when appropropriate

  • Added the following statement:

    “Please note this commission’s duties are in service to tokenholders. The commission may not explicitly limit tokenholder power and may not limit the rights of tokenholders in favor of any other stakeholder group in any way.”

  • Added the following statement:

    “We have run or proposed similar delegation programs in the past. The Protocol Delegation Program and recently proposed Chain Delegation Program are similarly temporary delegation programs aimed at increasing the representation of important tokenholder groups.”

  • Retierated the intention for the program to expire after Season 6

  • Added the following opt-in requirement:

    “Qualifying members must opt-in to be part of the Commission. Any qualifying member may choose not to opt-in for any reason. If less than 50% of qualifying members choose not to opt-in before the start of Season 5, the Commission may be reconsidered.”

  • Specified that participation requirements may be updated in Season 6, if the program is continued, if it is found to be overly restrictive.

  • Added the following statement regarding office hours:

    “This is to make sure the concerns of individual delegates can still be heard as protocols and OP Chains gain more voting power and could dominate discussions.”

Below we address additional feedback regarding the Expectations of the Commission


Expectations of the Commission

  • This program is best understood as a temporary measure to increase votable supply via delegation to a targeted tokenholder group - similar to what we’ve done with the Protocol Delegation Program and proposed Chain Delegation Program. This is meant to be a short term delegation program that increases the voting power of our highest impact delegates.

  • In exchange for receiving this delegation, Commission members will uphold the specified levels of engagement and serve the very important role of bridging communication between the Token House and Citizens’ House.

  • The Commission will create this bridge between Houses by filing two types of reports. The Commission has no decision making power in the Citizens’ House; they may only serve as a warning system. Each report requires 4 delegate approval from Commission members to be considered valid. The Citizens’ House may, of course, choose to disregard or disagree with a report.

    Report Type #1: Statement of Concern

    • To be shared with the Citizens’ House when an imbalance in power among tokenholders is arising in the Token House
    • When might this occur?
      • Any one tokenholder can unilaterally meet quorum or pass a proposal
      • A voting block has formed (between protocols or chains, for example) and that voting block can unilaterally meet quorum or pass a proposal
      • There is evidence of bribery or collusion among tokenholders

    Report Type #2: Request for Veto

    • Request for badgeholders to veto a specific proposal
    • When might this occur?
      • A tokenholder has violated the Code of Conduct and voted to pass their own proposal
      • There has been a violation of due process (a protocol upgrade that is not audited, for example) or delegates are unable or have insufficient time to assess the contents of a specific proposal
      • Any of the potential dynamics described under Report Type #1 will determine the outcome of a proposal
  • Ideally, these circumstances occur rarely or never, but we believe it is prudent to have an identified process and specified party responsible for alerting the Citizens’ House in the event these issues do arise. Of course, anyone in the DAO could also play this role (even with the existence of the Commission), but the Commission creates an easily identifiable group of high context delegates to entrust with this responsibility.

  • What if the Commission gets captured?

    • The delegation amount of 10M OP is intended to limit the possibility that the Commission could effectively capture the Token House, especially as votable supply increases
    • Commission votes will be cast according to a simple majority of all members. Individual votes should be publicly recorded (likely via Snapshot). As outlined in the Code of Conduct, members must not vote for their own proposals. Any capture of the Commission among members should be transparent and visible and may result in the removal of members violating the Code of Conduct.
    • The Commission has no ability to effectuate outcomes in the Citizens’ House, it can only make recommendations to the Citizens’ House.
  • Measures of success (thankt you for the suggestion to define this; it is something we would like to start doing for all Reflection Period proposals starting in Season 6.)

    • Goals of the Commission:
      • Increase votable supply: This is important to the resiliency of the system and the impact of this program on votable supply is known in advance
        • Alternatives: Airdrops, token grants, other delegation programs such as the Protocol Delegation Program or Chain Delegation Program, etc.
      • Define and uphold standards for top delegates: Does the Commission help refine standards for top delegate impact?
        • Alternative: A recognized delegate program in which top delegates are rewarded based on participation measures with no additional mandate
      • Retention of top individual delegates as OP Chains and protocols gain voting power: Do we retain our highest impact delegates over the next 12 months?
        • Alternative: Top delegates churn, continued efforts to increase delegation to high impact delegates organically
      • Establish a process and bridge for communication between Token House and Citizens’ House: Does the Commission result in established processes and useful communication lines between Houses?
        • Alternative: Leave this process undefined and fulfilled by unidentified delegates if/when an issue arises
    • Commission success should not be evaluated based on the number of reports filed or the amount of communication had with the Citizens’ House
  • The main alternative to this program is increasing the votable supply organically, which we are working on in tandem.

  • At the end of Season 6, it would be very interesting to do an analysis on whether any of the temporary delegation programs (Protocol Delegation Program, Chain Delegation Program, and/or the Anticapture Commission) were effective in increasing participation from the targeted tokenholder groups (as measured by voting participation during the program and retention thereafter).

Thank you for engaging in a very productive conversation around the Commission.


The Following Top 100 Delegates and Council Leads qualify to be a member of the Anticapture Commission in Season 5. The snapshot was taken as of 12/7/23.

Please note that membership will be re-calculated at the mid-point of the Season, or the end of Cycle #19, as outlined in the proposal above. The Foundation will be in touch with an opt-in form and additional details shortly. Please note All members will need to KYC to vote as a member of the Anticapture Commission.

Qualifying Delegates (actual membership may change based on opt-in rates)


Hi, would be great if the Optimism community can have more details about the Anticapture Commission covering the matters below.

(1) The challenges faced in Season 4 that necessitated the creation of an Anticapture Commission in particular how recognizing high-impact delegates and broadening tokenholder involvement align with addressing these challenges.

(2) The manner in which the Anticapture Commission will contribute to the overall health and effectiveness of governance including the the key benefits and expected outcomes from the functions of the Commission.

(3) The the significance of attending office hours for Anticapture Commission members and how this practice will enhance communication and representation.

(4) The importance of KYC for members to ensure a secure and transparent voting process preferably with a brief explanation of the KYC process and its significance.

(5) The reasons why members won’t receive OP rewards but will receive group delegation to help the community understand the rationale behind this decision.

Looking forward to some information on the above.


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(1) Challenges Faced in Season 4 and the Anticapture Commission:

In Season 4, feedback from delegates emphasized the importance of recognizing high-impact delegates and creating standards for their participation. The challenges likely revolved around ensuring that the most impactful voices were well-represented in governance decisions. The Anticapture Commission was introduced to address this by focusing on the representation of high-impact individual delegates and preventing any single entity from capturing the Token House.

(2) Contribution to Governance Health and Effectiveness:

The Anticapture Commission aims to uphold standards of delegate engagement, represent individual delegates as a key stakeholder group, and prevent the capture of the Token House by any single entity. By doing so, it enhances the overall health and effectiveness of governance by ensuring diverse representation and preventing undue influence. The key benefits include a more balanced decision-making process and increased transparency.

(3) Significance of Attending Office Hours:

Attending office hours is crucial for Anticapture Commission members to listen to community feedback, raise concerns on behalf of individual delegates, and ensure that the voices of individual delegates are heard. As protocols and OP Chains gain more voting power, regular communication through office hours enhances representation and maintains a connection between delegates and the broader governance community.

(4) Importance of KYC for Members:

KYC (Know Your Customer) for members is essential to ensure a secure and transparent voting process. KYC verifies the identity of each member, preventing fraudulent activities and ensuring that each vote is legitimate. This is crucial for maintaining the integrity of the Anticapture Commission and the overall governance process. I can’t answer how the KYC process is done, that’s for the Foundation to disclose.

(5) No OP Rewards but Group Delegation for Members:

Members won’t receive OP rewards but will receive group delegation to align with the purpose of the Anticapture Commission. The decision likely reflects a focus on incentivizing participation for the benefit of the community rather than individual financial gain. By excluding OP rewards, the Commission emphasizes its commitment to the collective interest of tokenholders and the health of the governance process.

In summary, the Anticapture Commission is designed to address challenges, enhance governance effectiveness, foster communication, ensure secure voting, and prioritize the collective interest of the community over individual rewards.


To all qualifying delegates - I’ve reached out to you with an opt-in form, but I realize some of you don’t check discord or telegram often; Please DM me here if you want to participate and I’ll share the form with you! (cc @FranklinDAO @404DAO @boilerblockchain @Griff @jackanorak @she256 @OPUser @Butterbum @MinimalGravitas)


Happy New Year! For all qualifying delegates that have opted-in to participate in the Anticapture Commission, please note that self-nominations to be the Commission Lead are due by the end of the day today, January 2nd. Please nominate yourself here.


Interesting fit, let’s give it a try :green_heart:


Hi @FranklinDAO @she256 @boilerblockchain @linda @olimpio @jacob @Griff @solarcurve

You’ve qualified to be a member of the Anticapture Commission for the second half of Season 5! You can review the proposal here: Anticapture Commission

If you would like to participate, please DM me so I can send you an opt-in form to complete by March 14th at 23:59 GMT.

cc @lavande

As outlined in the post above, membership has been re-calculated and re-evaluated at the mid-point of Season 5.

There were 2 outlined requirements of existing members:

  • To attend an office hours at least once per Voting Cycle (every three weeks)
  • To provide delegate approvals or a reason for not providing approval on >10% of the proposals requiring approval during the period

While many members did complete these requirements, we have decided not to remove any members for failure to complete them based on learnings and feedback during the first half of the Season.

  • Office Hours have not been as useful as originally imagined, while internal meetings have occurred more than expected. In any case, meeting requirements are challenging due to many timezones and should not prevent someone who is engaged asynchronously from participating. This requirement is likely to be removed in Season 6.

  • The Anticapture Commission is a first of its kind, governance structure, which means the current membership will continue to shape and evolve its mandate. The Commission decided that while the Anticapture Commission should vote on all Protocol Upgrades, they should not vote on other proposals, such as Mission Requests. As the majority of the proposal drafts in the first half of Season 5 were related to Mission Requests, the criteria to provide a minimum amount of draft approvals no longer makes sense.

All existing members must still qualify based on the requirements for all top 100 delegates:

  • Maintain = > 70% voting participation from time of first vote cast, provided > 3 votes cast. Delegates that cast their first vote in 2022 will be eligible with = > 65% voting participation. This parameter may be updated in Season 6, if the program is continued, if it is found to be overly restrictive.
  • Have received retro rewards for governance contributions, whether as delegates in any of S1-S4.

All existing members requalified based on these criteria, as well as three additional delegates that have opted-in to participated for the remainder of Season 5:

  • ITU Blockchain
  • Griff Green
  • she256

There are many other interesting learnings from the first Season of the Anticapture Commission, which will be shared during the next Reflection Period.

  • The Grants Council Lead was replaced midseason and the Security Council stepped down from the Anticapture Commission to focus fully on her duties on the Security Council. These positions were not replaced.