Introducing Doxamarket: Information Markets for Decentralized Governance

TL;DR Doxamarket is the first platform to incentivize decentralized governance through information markets, built by @privacypasta @lucacs @Sator and @yupuday. The launch of the V1 market Didomi on Base provides users the opportunity to speculate $DEGEN on Optimism’s Mission Request Round 2, specifically targeting the mission request related to farcaster social graph, via Farcaster frames.

The Problem with DeGov

Coordinating the decisions behind a decentralized protocol comes ripe with numerous challenges. Selecting the right ecosystem projects to fund, which tokens to list in a lending market, and the outcome of a protocol fee switch are valuable propositions that affect all community stakeholders. Once the combined value at stake reaches a critical mass, the founding team is unable to make decisions by themselves without running the risk of centralization. As a result, many aspects of the decentralized protocol model make governance unavoidable.

But token voting as a mechanism for decentralized governance has introduced its own set of problems. An inherent conflict of interest arises when voting power is disproportionately concentrated among a small group of wealthy token holders. As an example, venture funds or whales involved in external projects might be incentivized to pursue agendas that benefit their broader portfolio at the expense of the protocol’s long-term success. In addition, the over-reliance on token voting not only entrenches the power of a wealthy few but also undermines the collective action taken by smaller stakeholders. Smaller delegates within the Optimism ecosystem often refrain from voting due to their individual decisions “not mattering much”. The situation creates a paradox where the promise of decentralization leads to a quasi-centralization of power and an absence of true preferences.

Doxamarket aims to address these gaps by offering a novel approach to incentivize voter participation and mitigate the inefficiencies associated with governance.

Information Markets

Onchain information markets have gained immense popularity recently with the rise of Polymarket and liquidity-backed Kalshi. Their success confirms the financial value that assigning probabilities to future outcomes and sub outcomes can generate. Most importantly, we believe information markets carry an element of chaos that could be directly applied to form consensus in decentralized governance. The crypto space will always prefer chaotic and decisive action over stasis debates between two protocol researchers. Integrating information markets into the onchain decision-making process introduces a novel way to financially incentivize token-voting, increase voter participation, and force true preferences from broader ecosystem participants.

For the implementation of this idea, Doxamarket (formerly BetCaster) has received a grant of 50,000 OP from Optimism’s Mission Request Round 1.

Didomi as Doxamarket’s First Experiment

As the first experimental information market on Doxa, Didomi will grant users the ability to speculate $DEGEN on the winners of Optimism’s Mission Request Round 2. Didomi will open today as a multi-option contract market within Farcaster frames and will close on April 24th 7pm UTC. The market close is scheduled one day before the OP grant council releases final scores. Full details on the market mechanics behind Didomi can be found here.


Screenshot of Optimism Mission Request Schedule

Both the decision to use Farcaster frames and $DEGEN as the market currency are a testament to our belief in the strength of Farcaster and Base as the industry leaders in consumer crypto.

V1 is certainly not perfect and much will be improved on for Doxa’s V2 markets, but we intend for Didomi to be an experimental showcasing of information markets’ value for ecosystem funding initiatives.

‍Follow us on X and Warpcast to learn more about what Doxa is building. If you would like to partake in Doxa’s V1 market Didomi, check out live results here.

7 Likes

This is quite interesting…

Few initial thoughts:

  1. I worry that this “embrace of market chaos” is a justification to gamble on governance decisions. I can only think of how an election in the US might go if we were betting money as independent citizens on the outcome. Of course, we “bet” implicitly but there’s no market for your hard earned dollars on a democratic process.

  2. I can understand this on a community engagement perspective but im not sure this is a great decision for the integrity or culture of a network.

If I’m not understanding something, please enlighten me, but overall I stand by the idea that we need to take the crypto casino out of governance and will be cautious on this experiment in particular.

1 Like

Existing prediction markets focused on the US government play an instrumental role, acting as a valuable guide in the period leading up to elections (ie. Polymarket | Presidential Election Winner 2024).

Moreover, given that the governance structure of Optimism inherently mirrors that of a plutocracy, where financial wealth directly translates to greater voting influence, the implications of this system should not come as a surprise. This established dynamic merely reflects the practical realities of its operational framework.

1 Like

Valid concern. The “gambling” motivation, as we hypothesize, is likely to come from the general public who has 0 concerns of what governance is and just want to make a quick buck. To address it, we are considering limiting the scope of market participants to groups of individuals who met criteria including but not limited to:

  • Optimism Delegates
  • Badgeholders
  • Delegates meeting thresholds based on regenscore, karma, gov-score
  • RetroPGF recipients
  • etc.

However, counter to our thinking on scope-limiting is that prediction markets’ accuracy relies on a large sample size of participants as seen from implementation from Google internally.

There’s probably some balance between the two that we can explore through mechanism designs to discourage gamifying but also incentivizing participants to reveal their true preferences. If Gigabrains and gov-nerds have any ideas on this, feel free to reach out to me via my TG (@Atlantropaz) and I’d love to chat more on it.

All that being said, it’s very early days for us – PMF is far from being achieved. Till we see tractions…

Agreed, and just want to add that it’s not just the nature of plutocracy, but decentralized governance in general can often times, as Vitalik terms it, reach “stasis”. Information market like Doxa can faciliate consensus formation, serving as a skin-in-the-game type of “temp-check” before actual voting.

Didomi Market Updates :face_with_monocle:

I’m intrigued by the concept of Doxamarket. I’m eager to see how these experiments will unfold and impact the broader ecosystem.

Limiting who can participate goes against the core principles of permissionleness. Keep it open.

I’m interested in seeing Doxamarket in things such as upcoming Retro Funding Rounds.

One scenario of concern is the possibility of stakeholders influencing governance decisions to benefit financially from the market. For instance, if substantial bets are placed on a particular outcome, individuals with decision-making power might be tempted to sway results to their financial advantage.
Addressing these risks requires thoughtful consideration from the Collective.

1 Like

We are R&D’ing mechanisms that can ease some existing painpoints that all the delegates & badgeholders pointed out in this post. One use case of Doxa we are thinking particularly is leveraging the crowd (definition of crowd is TBD) to determine what projects/individuals should NOT receive the Retro Funding. If any delegates/badgeholders wanna brainstorm mechanism that is both easy-to-play and EV+ for the collective, plz reach out!

At the recent Funding the Common event, @LauNaMu and others pointed out the following pain points from the badgeholders

  • how to allocate the right #OP between e.g. Funding the Commons vs. Solidity
  • how to nudge badgeholders think in terms of a project’s past contributions

For the first point on # of OP to allocate to:

  • Maybe Doxa can serve as one of many “impact metrics” that badgeholders can refer back to.

For the second point on badgeholders:

  • The result of Doxamarket could potentially evaluate the performance of badgeholders.

These are all valid concerns. Time-weighted, votes-weighted, and “alignment-weighted” pricing mechanism could potentially address these issues. That being said, We’d love to work closely with the GovNerds and Gigabrains inside the Collective to combat all these edge cases in market manipulation.

1 Like

Doxamarket Mission Request Milestone 1 Progress Updates

Demo Time:

  • Didomi Tutorial/Demo
    • Deployed on Base with bets in $DEGEN. It is focused on Mission Request grantee prediction.
    • Everything is verifiable in Warpcast Frames and Smart Contracts
    • Reward Distribution logic is simple: winner takes pro-rata shares from losers’ side.
  • Proposal Prediction Infra Demo
    • Deployed on Optimism with bets in $OP. It is focused on proposal outcome prediction.
    • Verifiable in Smart Contracts
    • Since prediction markets on governance proposals depend on proposals to surface in forum, we are currently unable to demo a real proposal’s market. Once interesting proposals appear in upcoming cycles, we will have the Warpcast frames and market questions ready for the prediction market. However, the demo and Didomi’s Demo should be sufficient to showcase that the basic infra is ready to go.
    • The basic logic is equivalent to Didomi. The only thing differs is the market question.
  • NFT Minting Infra Demo
    • For people who voted in a given OP onchain proposal with proposal_id, they can free-mint an “I Voted” NFT in frames
    • It can be accessible in frames when Doxa or anyone casts: https://doxa.market/nft/<Proposal_ID>
    • This will be used for tasks listed in Milestone 1.5, for user-alignment with the OP collective, and for credential use-cases for the prediction market.