After discussions with the elected Token House Code of Conduct Council and the Grants Council, the Foundation would like to propose a change to two proposal types pertaining to grant misusage. The goal of these changes is to eliminate delegate responsibility for grant misusage enforcement. This is based on strong feedback from delegates that they do not wish to vote on enforcement actions and the establishment of an experimental Token House Code of Conduct Council, which could instead process grant misusage reports as representatives of the Token House.
Currently, Collective grants may be clawed back for failure to meet critical milestones. The Grant Clawback is a proposal type, outlined in the Operating Manual, that currently requires a full Token House vote. Based on delegate feedback that delegates do not want to vote on Code of Conduct matters, this proposal would remove the Grant Clawback proposal type from the Operating Manual and re-classify Grant Clawback as an enforcement option under the Grant Policies (which are processed under the Code of Conduct, by the Token House Code of Conduct Council.)
Currently, the Token House may implement a Future Grant Freeze against grant recipients that have violated the Grant Policies, enforceable via the Code of Conduct. We propose removing Future Grant Freeze as an enforcement action approved by the full Token House and replacing it with the Grant Misusage Process. This process outlines a clear protocol for the objective reporting and verification of grant misusage, to be documented in a public database that can be referenced by anyone when making future grant decisions. We believe this is a governance-minimized way to maintain accountability for grant recipients without requiring Token House delegates to be involved in enforcement decisions.
This proposal is put forward by the Foundation and, therefore, does not require delegate approvals. This proposal will move to a vote in Voting Cycle #17.
If this proposal passes, can a future grant freeze still be proposed and voted on by the token house? Or does the entirety of this power transfer over to the Grant Misusage process?
Also, I don’t see a time limit on this process change. Will these changes have to be reconfirmed in the future? What would it take to change this new policy in the future if it were to pass now?
If this proposal passes, can a future grant freeze still be proposed and voted on by the token house? Or does the entirety of this power transfer over to the Grant Misusage process?
Aligned with the principle of governance minimization, this proposal would remove the Future Grant Freeze proposal type and replace it with the Grant Misusage process, which creates a public database that anyone can reference when making future grant decisions. The motivation behind this proposed change is to maintain accountability for grant recipients while removing enforcement responsibility, and a voting requirement, from delegates.
Also, I don’t see a time limit on this process change. Will these changes have to be reconfirmed in the future? What would it take to change this new policy in the future if it were to pass now?
This proposal will remove these proposal types from the Operating Manual indefinitely. The Operating Manual is currently maintained by the Foundation, so the Foundation can add proposal types but cannot remove them without delegate approval.
The proposal tries to minimize governance for the delegates which is something that I personally don’t mind. It’s well intentioned but I am going to vote against it for the following reasons:
It is removing the power of grant freezes from the token house delegates
Creates a rather complicated grant misuse reporting process, centralized around the foundation. There is too much centralization around the Optimism foundation already. We should aim for less of that, not more.
I believe removing enforcement responsibility from delegates is a step in the right direction, however, the proposed design of the Grant Misuse Reporting Process would appear to leave several Grant types in Season 5 without a clear path on how to be reported.
Much like @lefterisjp , we (@blockchainatusc) voted against this proposal as we do not believe the grant freeze power should be taken away from token house delegates. Although we support the idea of giving delegates less work to do, in the extreme case that the token house agrees that someone should not be eligible to receive grant funding, they should be able to take that action. The token house should be the ultimate owner of governance funds, they should be allowed to revoke people’s access to it.