[FINAL] Budget Board Advisory Proposal for the DAO Operating Budget for Seasons 8 and 9

Budget Board Advisory Proposal for the DAO Operating Budget for Seasons 8 and 9 (Updated)

The following is a non-binding proposal for the Collective to consider in passing a DAO Operating Budget for Seasons 8 and 9. The proposal is informed by the Budget Board’s good faith review of historical information provided to the Collective. The content is presented “as-is” without a certification of its accuracy or effectiveness. The Collective is encouraged to review any and all information, including numerical information, made available to the Collective in making its budget determinations.

Note that an earlier version of this proposal showed ~6.39 years of illustrative runway. That figure was based on an erroneous community budget tracker. The current proposal shows an illustrative ~4.89 years of runway. This figure could change once the Missions budget is proposed; however, for the benefit of the community, the Board has provided its best understanding to date.

TL;DR

  • Proposes a DAO Operating Budget ceiling of 4,440,000 OP total for one year (Seasons 8-9)
  • Represents approximately 25.8% of trailing twelve month (TTM) Collective Revenue when adjusted for a 6-month Eth-OP conversion
  • Adds a 0.8% margin above a 25.0% benchmark to provide flexibility for council leads to propose budgets tied to credible growth or sustainability theses
  • Council leads may consider allocating part of their budgets retroactively based on performance

Budget Details

Metric Value
TTM Collective Revenue (June 2024 - May 2025) 6971.3 ETH
ETH-OP 6 Month TWAP Rate 2,469.2
Budget Ceiling 4,440,000 OP
% of TTM Revenue 25.8%
Budget Board Infrastructure 80,000 OP (separate from above)

Note: ETH-OP rate uses a 6 Month TWAP from Jan. 3, 2025 - June 3, 2025. Assumed OP-ETH is the reciprocal. TTM Revenue is based on June 2024 - May 2025 data.

Strategic Rationale

This proposal sets a ceiling for DAO operating expenses over the coming year, replacing the prior season-by-season approach with a more stable framework tied to trailing protocol revenue.

For reference, the Season 7 operating budget—when annualized—represented 23.7% of annualized Collective Revenue as of May 2025. We view this as near the high watermark for DAO spend relative to revenue.

Using TTM revenue gives a more stable and normalized view of protocol performance. While it results in a slightly higher nominal budget, we believe it offers a better benchmark for ongoing budgeting decisions.

Given the early stage of the Collective, it is appropriate to err on the side of enabling growth. At the same time, we expect operating spend to decrease as a share of revenue over time.

This budget was also constructed with runway in mind. If Missions spending remains consistent with Season 7 levels, the Governance Fund maintains approximately 4.89 years of runway under this proposal, without decreasing the operations budget.

That leaves the Collective with ample room to experiment, grow, and move toward protocol-sustainable operations—without pressure to curtail operating capacity prematurely.

Illustrative Runway Analysis

Note: The Budget Board has not yet reviewed the Missions Budget. A full Missions Budget proposal is expected by July 2, 2025.

Metric Value
Gov. Fund Remaining 124,327,380 OP [A]
Illustrative Annual Allocations
Operating Budget 4,440,000 OP
Gov. Missions Budget 21,000,000 OP

Total Illustrative Annual Budget: 25,440,000 OP [B]

Years of Budget: ~4.89 [A/B]

Budget Glidepath

The Budget Board envisions a long-term decline in the percentage of revenue allocated to DAO operations:

Year % of TTM Revenue
Year 1 26.00%
Year 2 21.88%
Year 3 18.75%
Year 4 15.63%
Year 5 12.50%

This is a directional target, not a hard cap, and will be revisited based on performance and protocol evolution.

Note that in this amended proposal, we have used a 6-month TWAP Eth-OP conversion. This is based on feedback and internal review suggesting that the recent volatility in Eth-OP conversion merits a shorter duration conversion period. We believe the historical median is relevant for a relatively large set of historical data, but we believe that the community may review the rate as necessary for budget updates. The 25.8% budget figure is derived by comparing historicals to the overall median. This represents a translation and that should be considered, as the 25.8% is not otherwise “apples to apples”.

Room for Execution

The additional 0.8% above the 25.0% benchmark is intentional. As the Collective transitions from ad hoc budgeting to a structured Budget Board process, it is important to allow council leads space to propose budgets that build on established initiatives and advance credible growth or sustainability theses.

As this is the first full-year budget, we recommend reviewing the trailing six-month Collective Revenue before Season 9 to determine whether the budget remains appropriate for the DAO’s needs and strategic direction.

Leads are also encouraged to reserve a portion of their budgets for retroactive rewards tied to performance and outcomes. We will refer to this as a Retroactive Allocation, to clarify that it comes from the Governance Fund and not from the RPGF funds.

Implementation

  • Ceiling: 4.44M OP governs DAO operations across Seasons 8 and 9
  • Allocations: Council leads will propose budgets within this ceiling
  • Discretionary Buffer: Leads may allocate retroactive rewards from the Retroactive Allocation at their discretion, within the 4.44M OP cap
  • Review: Budget Board will evaluate spend and impact following Season 8

Counter-Theses

The Budget Board believes that Collective Revenue is the best metric for assessing budget intensity over the long term; however, the Collective should consider counter theses in forming future budgets.

  • Revenue volatility: The Collective operates in a highly volatile industry, and revenue is dependent on endogenous and exogenous factors. If revenue declines in a given trailing twelve-month period, the Collective should consider whether there is a relationship between the DAO operations and the decline. For instance, if revenue declines due to a preventable security incident within the remit of one of the Councils, the Collective should consider to what extent the budget should be adjusted (up or down). Similarly, if revenue increases dramatically, the Collective should scrutinize whether the increased revenue warrants an increased budget. In Seasons 8 and 9, volatility may be addressed by the Midpoint Adjustments process in January 2026. In mature form, the DAO operations should provide leverage to the Collective, in line with the prescribed decline in operating budget relative to the Collective revenue over time. The Budget Board and the Councils will aim to formalize KPIs for the community to assist in assessing budget questions in the future.

  • Retroactive rewards: The Collective has a long term goal of incentivizing impact through retroactive rewards. Retroactive rewards enable councils to make localized decisions about certain tasks that might require additional incentives above the baseline as well as to determine whether performance merits incremental rewards. In recent seasons, councils have begun experimenting with localized incentive allocations, and the Board believes that this process should be formalized through the Retroactive Allocation. Deference should be given to the leads as to what percentage of an individual council’s operating budget should be designated for baseline operations and what allocation should be used for the Retroactive Allocation. With limited data, we offer soft guidance for an 80%/20% split of baseline relative to Retroactive Allocations.

Budget Board Infrastructure Request

The Budget Board requests a one-time allocation of 80,000 OP to support data analysis, operational tooling, and other services required to evaluate budgets and spending effectiveness. This is a standalone request and is not included in the 4.44M OP ceiling or calculated as a percentage of Collective Revenue. As the Budget Board is at its inception, the needs of the Board are not yet well known. Should this allocation be unnecessary, the Board recommends that any unused amounts return to the Governance Fund.

Questions for the Future

As we look forward to future budget processes, we will apply some basic questions to this framework on a retrospective basis, including:

  • Did councils stay within their allocations?
  • Did the revenue-indexing approach provide appropriate stability?
  • Was the 0.8% flexibility buffer sufficient?
  • Did the Retroactive Allocation enable consistent proportionality of incentives relative to the requirements and impacts of the tasks performed by the council / board?

Conclusion

This budget reflects the Collective’s current operating scale and maturity. It enables execution, supports growth-oriented initiatives, and reinforces the long-term need for efficiency. With a clear ceiling and structured discretion for leads, it provides a solid foundation for Seasons 8 and 9.

16 Likes

Hi @danelund.eth,

We’ve run some cost simulations and believe the suggested budget ceiling is too low to guarantee sufficient talent to fill all key roles, especially for Impact Level 7 functions which influence a significant share of OP spending and should be operated by highly capable contributors.

All roles are compensated in OP, which fluctuates a lot in pricing. However, contributors often need to cash out a significant share to pay for taxes and expenses.

We agree % of TTM Revenue is a good reference for determining indicative budgets; however believe the approach of taking the Median ETH-OP rate over nearly 3 years is the wrong approach as it’s not a good reflection of the “purchasing power” of OP tokens today.

Using today’s price, the real ETH-OP rate is over 3 times higher than the median used in your calculation.

We believe the overall budget and compensation should better reflect the ACTUAL value of OP and a cost-based assessment of the actual talent and services required to effectively coordinate collective resources.

Question: Based on your simulations, what effects would the budget cap have on the ability of the Collective to compete for and retain talent?

10 Likes

Also scratching my head at the use of the Median ETH-OP rate.

This creates a pretty distinct disadvantage that DAO contributors have in their compensation. When OP value is low, median is used, but when its high, the foundation tends to take advantage of their optionality and use current value.

IF we are to use something like long-term median during the “bad” times, we need to commit to the same thing during the “good” times. Although I still think that is probably the wrong approach.

Can you please provide more color on that metric and why we are not using current rates?

3 Likes

Some other questions I have:

  • What was the total DAO operating spend in seasons 6 & 7 in terms of OP/ETH/USD? This information should really be here. I’m assuming the budget board has access to it and it is obviously relevant to any discussion on this topic, we shouldn’t force each delegate to individually comb through the forums to find it.
  • What is the estimated breakdown per council, and what was the council spend in each of the last 2 seasons?
  • How strong is the enforcement on this proposal? What is the profit to raise/lower the budget if conditions change?
2 Likes

I’d also like to see a breakdown per council. Just considering the SC, DAB, M&M, and GC operating budgets proposed for Season 7 (Dec 2024), the total comes to 1.055M OP for a single Season. I agree that the historical median from May 31, 2022 to June 3, 2025 might not be the best reference. If we focus on the period between Feb 12 and June 12 (the vesting period for GC members), the median is 2,437, which is a significant difference. If I’m interpreting the changes for Season 8 correctly, the Collective will require really specialized decision-makers, and I’m not sure the current rewards might be sufficient to attract them.

4 Likes

Dropping the S7 Operating Budgets here since seeing some comments for them:

Total: 1.055m (cc: @Michael @brichis @SuperchainEco)

From our perspective and the M&M Council, this puts the prior budgets just about in line with the proposed cap in OP terms (for 2 seasons). However, it’s worth noting last season as the DAO was voting in budgets, OP was around $2 (mid December 2024). Today as of writing, OP is ~29% of that ($0.58/token), which also means keeping the same OP denominated budgets would be a ~70%+ paycut for the members. Quite a few members from the last councils have voiced that they likely wouldn’t run again if stipends stay at this rate this season, and we’re sincerely worried we’ll lose some good talent.

We’d be interested similar to @Michael’s point regarding if the budget board’s proposal is a hard cap? Further, we think exploring some sort of buffer, or USD, or combo denominated payments would make more sense going forward with budgets: Keep and attract good talent, while not over/under paying members too much.

5 Likes

Our understanding of the scope of the proposal is that it is advisory and the community can choose to vote for it or against it. You can find the internal work that the budget board considered in the linked spreadsheet, but note that this is presented “as is” without a representation of accuracy.

Concepts like USDC are beyond what the Board has to consider, as this is purely tied to the Governance Fund. To the extent that there would be a variance from this proposed budget, we defer to the Foundation on procedure.

At this point, we would only support this OP cap if access to other funding sources (like the governance-owned ETH) is guaranteed to be available.

Our position is not final, but this cap seems quite low, especially since we believe there to be functions the Foundation currently fills that can be more cheaply offloaded to governance. So this cap would create a lot of friction between council leads to fight for a tiny budget, and leave no room for expansion of governance.

It would be very helpful to get cost breakdowns of comparable units within the Foundation so there is something to compare requests of leads to.

Attn: @lavande on the request for comparable operating budgets for similarly sized and scoped Foundation units

2 Likes

Your comment is inconsistent with the specified purpose of the Budget Board:

" The Budget Board will bring us closer to achieving important decentralization milestones."

Reducing the USD-denominated budget of the DAO operations by 70%, without taking into account the effect that those suggested budgets would have on ACTUAL operations and overall Optimism Collective function and competitiveness, will have a negative influence on talent retention and decentralization.

This suggested budget would be a step backward for decentralization.

We urge the Budget Board to reassess their simulations and provide more context on the expected impact their recommendation will have** on overall Collective and DAO operations.

Our recommendation: While we agree we should be produdent in our spending, we believe the OP denominated budget should be ~2x higher then what is suggested here (for context, the OP Foundation request for S8 is ~2.3x higher then S7 in terms of OP requested for operations) to be able to retain and attract the right talent and solutions required for the DAO to perform.

5 Likes

I have deep respect for Dane and know how much work went into this.

While I left feedback about electing leads without knowing their budgets here, I also want to point out a disconnect: this proposal keeps DAO operations flat, while Foundation-driven spend is getting significantly larger.

Season 7 estimated ~37M–50M OP from the Foundation budget. For Season 8, that range jumps to ~49M–79M OP, with some individual line items like “Stage 1 Chain Growth” increasing from 5–10M to 20–40M OP.

I support the call for austerity, but it should apply to everyone, not just Councils and Boards.

10 Likes

Edit: I am in the process of reviewing the revised proposal and will update this post after reviewing

I think this is a very strong point, especially given that the DAO budget ceiling is a tiny % of increase in the foundation budget.

I am all for austerity, but there needs to be a concrete thesis around this.

I think @GFXlabs also has a good point… if we are using Collective Revenue as a basis, why don’t we just have a cap as a % of collective revenue, priced in ETH?

As it stands, I will be voting against this proposal for the following reasons:

  • The baseline is ETH when the budget is OP (this could be fixed by using ETH as part of the DAO budget)
  • We are using historical price data for this baseline. It makes no sense to price this in anything other than today’s price, which is the best predictor of the future price.
  • This is a 1-year budget cap. This prevents us from adapting to changes in Collective revenue or OP/ETH price changes
  • This budget implies austerity, yet the foundation budget is increasing drastically. If the goal is to shift work from the DAO to the foundation, that should be stated explicitly. As it stands there doesn’t seem to be a clear thesis on WHY we are doing what we are doing given these contradictions
5 Likes

We appreciate the thoughtful feedback on the proposed budget size—it has been duly noted. While we shared a draft of this proposal a week in advance, we understand that important dialogue can emerge at different stages, and we welcome that engagement at any point in the process.

Some of the concerns raised—particularly around the broader relationship between the DAO and the Foundation—go beyond the Budget Board’s specific remit. Our role was to propose a framework for the Governance Fund’s operating budget. That said, we recognize that these structural questions are significant and deserve space in the appropriate governance forums.

Regarding the budget itself, the proposed ceiling was based on several factors, including the estimated runway of the Governance Fund, historical OP-ETH conversion rates, and the desire to maintain flexibility for future seasons. These assumptions are, of course, open to different takes, and we welcome reasoned input that can strengthen collective decision-making. I leave it to the Foundation to specify the process for a new budget if this one fails, but if another budget is proposed and approved, due consideration should be given to the runway of the Governance Fund.

To clarify: this is not necessarily a fixed annual budget. The Season 7–8 calendar includes a Midpoint Assessment, providing an opportunity to revisit allocations as needed.

Our working assumption is that the Governance Fund remains the sole source of funding for DAO operations. However, we’re encouraged by the creative ideas shared and hope contributors will continue to surface alternative models and approaches through the governance process.

4 Likes

Hi @danelund.eth, thanks for sharing your context.

Do we read correctly that the proposed recommendation will remain unchanged and that you aim to submit this amount to vote?

1 Like

Thank you for the clarifications and additional context @danelund.eth, I appreciate your nuance here.

My concerns as outlined in my post above still stand, and given that some of them are out-of-scope for the budget board I would love a response from the Foundation, as these concerns are interrelated with DAO budget.

I posted a similar topic on the Intent AMA thread and will hopefully have a chance to discuss them in the AMA next week.

In the meantime, I will dive deeper into the attached rational to see if I can bring my point of view more in line with the specifics outlined in this proposal.

1 Like

To clarify any ambiguity about what will happen if this proposal fails, it is the same as with any other proposal. A revised proposal(s) will need to be resubmitted by the Budget Board until one passes. This will delay Councils and Boards from submitting their own operating budget proposals/operating, and so the Budget Board and the community are incentivized to work together to arrive at a proposal that will pass.

2 Likes

Why is this? There’s no requirement that this pass prior to other proposals. In fact, there’s never been a Budget Board before.

It seems like individual proposals do not need to be delayed, and the effect would be that any final Budget Board proposal would simply have a floor of all approved budgets.

Also, it’s tiring to hear “if governance doesn’t do XYZ thing that it didn’t ask for, actual business of governance will be delayed.” This threat was used with the sortition proposal, and it proved to be a bluff. Forgive us if we’re skeptical that a failed Budget Board proposal would delay anything else at this stage.

2 Likes

Based on the feedback received and the knowledge that we can provide an update, the Board will consider a revision to the proposal, very likely consistent with the general framework provided.

4 Likes

Does a guest voter fall under the Collective Reward Framework in Season 7 and 8/9?

Please ask this question in the corresponding post :slight_smile:

1 Like

You are correct that this is a new proposal type that is being introduced; happy to explain the logic behind it:

Most DAOs have individual teams / working groups / councils put forward budget proposals, which are each approved in isolation. In most cases, these end up aggregating to a total DAO operating budget that is not cohesive or sustainable. In many cases, this has lead to the post-facto realization that DAO spend is not sustainable and/or that runway is shorter than anticipated, which has led to contributor cuts of up to 65% (either in terms of reduction in budget or elimination of some groups entirely) or spending freezes. Some DAOs try to remedy this by putting a specific working group in charge of setting the individual budgets of other groups, which has (mostly) failed due to the principle-agent problem this introduces.

This proposal type attempts to strike a balance between the two approaches and enable the Collective to avoid these outcomes by first asking governance to consider the total aggregate budget that would enable the accomplishment of strategic outcomes but also be sustainable. I’m optimistic that a feedback loop between the community and the Budget Board can help inform what a reasonable operating budget would look like. At a minimum, I view it as an improvement that topics such as TTM revenue and runway are being discussed as a result of this proposal.

The Foundation is not trying to ensure the outcome of any given proposal. Instead we are trying to balance many tactical tradeoffs. In the case of the Milestones and Metrics selection mechanism, the tradeoff was between delaying the start of governance but doing an on-chain transfer to a community managed multisig or moving ahead on schedule but doing the transfer to a multisig temporarily controlled by the Foundation. We were wrong in our calculation that the community would prefer the onchain transfers to occur to multisigs managed by the community, but adapted based on community feedback. We will take a similar approach with this proposal, navigating various tradeoffs and responding to community feedback.

4 Likes