@op_julian It looks like you’ve assigned an ineligible delegate to our proposal as a reviewer . Had some back and forth here so that is good to know. We are definitely still interested in moving this forward.
We’ll ask around. @Tane Is there something we could clarify to get your endorsement?
We thought there were 4 qualified approvals from Top 100 delegates if raho’s approval is considered valid. @op_julian or @Gonna.eth or someone should clarify if it’s not the case, otherwise it’s pretty confusing to applicants and delegates who approve.
Our concern is that this Request, as it seemed to be originally created like an application for RabbitHole, is targeted only for one protocol to grab a huge 200k OP allocation. We also recognize that it’s possible for other protocols to apply and the Request itself clarify multiple applicants to be able to apply, thus we would like to ask if any cap is to be applied for each application if we are to decide for an approval.
@Tane We had some initial confusion around the template as well as confusion around the approval process. Certainly agree we have received mixed messages across the board here.
The intent was certainly not to siphon of funds to one protocol, it’s simply asking for funds to allocate towards delegation incentives (which would mostly flow to users!). For context, 200K OP represents 3% of 6.8M OP, which was the amount distributed across 57,204 Optimism delegators during the Airdrop 2, which was considered effective.
We feel as though regardless of who executes this strategy, 200K OP is an appropriate amount to distribute towards such an expiremental incentive program towards rewarding active delegation (rather than retroactive).
Our understanding was delegates would be deciding which applicants, assuming the mission is approved, receive funding (perhaps we could divide the share amongst the accepted applicants based on percentage of votes, or evenly above a threshold?). This does complicate things at the admin level, however.
That makes a lot of sense. Basically, it’s similar to an ask in a STIP/LTIPP (we share the context in Arbitrum) application with incentives used for users, not only protocols. In that case, we are still not sure about how the grant is distributed to multiple applicants, or only the winner would get the whole amount for their application…
Our understanding is that Grants Council plays a role in selecting applications based on each Mission Request, but we are still new to the process, so it might be wrong.
In any case, we believe promising applications on this request would make reasonable impacts in return of an assigned amount of incentives. We still want an answer on who’s qualified to give approvals, but here is our approval.
We are an Optimism delegate with sufficient voting power and believe this Request is ready to move to a vote.
I see that this proposal already has enough approvals but anyway wanted to signal my support for the experimentation in that field. However, I would like to point out for potential future proposers that I would expect some further discussion on what are those actions/initiatives that we’d like to incentivize/reward in DAO governance using these mechanisms. My concern is that if we end up with wrong types of actions being incentivised we will be funding noise generation (meaningless activity) instead of valuable contributions, so we need to be careful about the execution on a particular mission proposal level.
I think some of the possibilities are really interesting. Ideally these campaigns are iterative, with feedback loops and thesis to measure against.
Specifications for re-delegation campaign could be designed using many criteria, but one example would be to incentivize people delegated to delegates who have never voted, to delegate instead towards a range of performant or active delegates.
Whitelisting/exclusion listing for this kind of incentive means that you could essentially target delegates based on any criteria, but to simplify let’s use the examples below:
Inactive delegates are defined as delegates that have voted on less than 25% of active Optimism Snapshot and Agora proposals.
Active delegates are defined as those who have voted on > 75% of Optimism Snapshot and Agora proposals.
This could increase the OP participating in governance dramatically. Furthermore, other delegation incentives could also be structured to target diversification, reward up-and-coming delegates, etc. But you are right that incentive design in this sense is absolutely critical.
I’m torn here. Although I appreciate the link to the researched paper on incentives, that paper specifically cited the fact that there’s an expectation for further governance rewards over a long time horizon as a key driver for successful outcomes. Also, since the foundation controls the airdrop requirements, the incentives aren’t as easily gamed. I don’t think these quests would be like that. I also think largescale governance incentives should probably be designed thoughfully over a long time horizon, which this mission is not requesting (rather, 1 month of concurrent campaigns). For these reasons I’m leaning towards non-approval.
Hi @chaselb, I think you’re under-estimating the stickiness of delegation. Most users who have delegated have done so passively, with a set-it, forget-it mentality.
While Optimism’s airdrops reward this passive behavior, direct incentives provide an opportunity to actively direct delegation, allowing for those who have delegated to inactive delegates, who have not participated or engaged in governance, to be compensated w/ more governance power (OP) in order to direct their voting weight towards valuable contributors.
These types of quests might be less effective if conducted on a rolling basis, but as an experiment over a few months I think it’s hard to argue the potential benefits here for the ecosystem at large. One just needs to take a look at voting on the current Mission Requests to understand the need for greater participation…