@MattL can you clarify if the tokens they have in the multisig (unable to vote) are community delegations or was it a grant of optimism?
Yeah that makes sense. My worry is that it would be a bit haphazard without some guidelines around how much total voting power should be self-delegated grants, no guidelines around expectations for how self-delegating protocols should behave etc. If the goal is, protocols should have a voice in governance, building a cohesive strategy and grant allocation around self-delegation could be an option.
Replying to this from email so pardon me if it looks weird.
The inaccessible tokens in our original multisig is from community delegations. Our new multisig has already received 2M from the Synthetix Treasury Council.
That’s not what is being proposed, we’re going to be leaving the self delegation until the Synthetix TC uses that 2m for incentives. That’s what was laid out in the SIP, and was meant to be carried over to the forums.
Regarding self delegation - I don’t personally have an issue with self delegations being used by protocols, but I do think it’s one of those case by case items that has to be worked through as a part of the overall review of proposals. It’s a tough issue, but I think protocols have a say in overall OP governance is better for all of OP.
Hey MattL, this is a bit concerning.
Currently the 2M are delegated and SNX Ambassadors controls both addresses. This means that potentially have 3.4M voting power as per the dune dashboard and are by far one of the biggest delegate.
Are you guys going to be using BOTH, supposing the issues relating to the msig are solved?
We think that due to this delegation being included in internal Synthetix governance, and Synthetix’s large impact on the overall ecosystem it shouldn’t be thought of as concerning. We have a great deal of projects in our ecosystem, and many outside of it who we work with all the time to help them grow or bring them to Optimism.
Synthetix cares deeply about Optimism and we think we’re in a position to play a great role in governance.
Lol; it is true what you say?
Agree. I too find this very concerning.
- To put it politely, this group & their associates are very, very ‘firm’ with the rest of the community when they’re stood up to.
- Their first of the three arguments about disclosure allowing self-delegation appears to only claim disclosure was made within internal SNX documents, and not the formal, public voting proposal format. Yes?
- The other two arguments they make are essentially, ‘We don’t like losing Snapshot elections and/or having to campaign so hard, so essentially were just going to make ourselves the most powerful delegate irrespective of what anyone thinks, and this will include the 2m tokens that were granted in the very first allocation (beyond their earned delegation) to allow us to do this’.
For the record, I don’t doubt the importance of Synthetix to the overall defi landscape, I just think an eventual voting power of 3.4m tokens overstates their importance and is contrary to a vision of decentralisation.
If anyone thinks I’m being too cynical, just ask yourselves: When they cast their 3.4m votes which stakeholder will rank higher in their voting decision, the Synthetix organisation or the Optimism Collective? (Hint: these two should not be one in the same).
this is: regardless of what was SET by Optimism, and re-clarified in the last update
this statement borders on ignorance
The problem is not the 3.4M $OP; but the EXPROPRIATION; if that amount of tokens was bought by the protocol or delegated by the community; Synthetix, like any person or protocol, may make use of them; what they did not understand here is that they do not correspond to them; these $OPs ARE NOT PROPERTY OF THE PROTOCOL, Synthetix is just a means for these tokens to reach the purpose declared in the proposal
The protocols must take the proposals seriously; Respecting the rules is key, especially when:
Looks like there is a fair bit of controversy here, so for clarity I want to try and parse this into 3 separate issues with presumably different levels of agreement.
The 1.4m OP tokens controlled by snxambassadors.eth should be able to vote but have not been able to due to technical issues. It seems perfectly reasonable to either move these, replace them or whatever with tokens in an address that allows them to participate in governance. If the preferred solution to this issue in particular is to take 1.4m tokens from a separate allocation and use them for voting then I would assume that very few people would have any objection to this, it seems completely fair (and with hindsight should probably have been done with all delegates who suffered from the multisig related Snapshot difficulties ages ago).
Use 2.1m OP tokens that were part of the 9m given initially to vote in governance until they are distributed through other means. This was not included in the request for the tokens, but was decided on in your protocol’s internal governance.
The controversy here is obviously around whether disclosures on the use of tokens can be described as ‘adequate’ if they are not included in the proposal. I would lean towards no if this could set a precedent for any future projects using the OP they have been issued for, well anything, without feeling the need to include it in the proposal presented to Optimism delegates. Additionally, it is obvious that many DAOs have comically centralized governance (such as the 3 accounts that outweigh everyone else in Lido’s Snapshots), which means that we would be potentially allowing for a much simpler attack vector is we allow this to be a precedent.
On the other hand, in lieu of the 1.4m issue described above, and Synthetix’s clearly established position in the ecosystem, I think a fair point could be made that we could accept this as a one-off and use it to establish a rule going forward (similar to how we have been lenient in accepting late entries to Snapshot rounds previously etc). The difference between 1.4m and 2.1m is perhaps not massively important?
- Combining both options to give a total vote of 3.5m as seems to be a concern of @Netrim and @Axel_T . Unless I’m misreading the thread that’s not what’s being suggested here, there still isn’t a resolution to the inaccessible 1.4m as far as I know so this would be a replacement rather than an addition (correct me if I’m wrong @MattL).
If that were to be the case then I imagine most would agree that is a very different scenario. For a team to just decide that because they are already a powerful part of the ecosystem and don’t like the way some votes have gone that they should just be able to decide to become by far the most powerful delegate, taking more power than someone who has been trusted by about 14,000 delegators, would surely represent a governance attack, regardless of whether the attacker believes they are doing it for the greater good of the community or whatever, that’s a story presumably almost as old as humans have been experimenting with governance!
I’m guessing that the majority of the community would see nothing wrong with 1, a lot wrong with 3, and so the discussion should mostly focus around 2. Personally I think the issue there is more about what precedent this sets for proposals honest intentions for use of tokens than this specific case.
- I think this is a great summary, and it would be great if someone from Synthetix could confirm this is what it boils down to.
- On a personal note, the @MinimalGravitas answer is much more conciliatory than my own, and also doesn’t have the attitude mine did. So (a) thanks for taking the higher ground, and (b) their response is how I would have preferred to answer if I had more time & was less reactionary.
In regards to the summarised issues, my opinion is:
- I have no issue with the 1.4m OP, the case is quite clear and very hard to argue against.
- I’m hoping I’m wrong with the 3.5m OP. This isn’t going to happen in 3-18 months time when the technical issue is resolved? Yes/no?
- I’m less inclined to give another ‘benefit of the doubt’ approval or another ‘this one last time’ approval in regards to the 2.1m OP. I think at some point there needs to be a line in the sand and an end to the exceptions. The ultimate question, if disclosure allows self-delegation, is whether this self-delegation was disclosed to the community voters prior to the original allocation decision. This should be a pretty simple Yes or No answer (for example, pointing to a public, timestamped source), and if the answer requires a great deal of qualification or justification, then that points to the answer simply being ‘No’, it wasn’t disclosed …and that’s where the line needs to be drawn.
- I’m not that active here, so I’m willing to defer to those who commit more time to Optimism Governance.
- 1.4m OP is still a great deal of voting power, and should remedy a lot of the frustrations the SNX team is having in getting their voice heard.
- I just hope that this decision can be made by the community (or even a dedicated Snapshot vote) and not arbitrarily by whoever at the end holds the keys.
Thanks for your time, and apologies for my combative style in my earlier reply.
Thanks for the summary.
My concern is three folded:
- Not properly disclosed at the time of the proposal on optimism discourse governance.
Not an issue at the time, bad precedent to have.
Want to delegate those because the timeline for distribution is long?
Amend your original proposal and vote it on snapshot, this thread was posted and the discussion is still ongoing, but the delegation is already a fact
- Using the same tokens to mirror the inaccessible delegated voting power onto snxambassadors.eth
This is the actual proposal I would have liked to discuss and I am fine with this until their issues are resolved. Not being able to vote has underrepresented all the voting power the Synthetix community entrusted to their Ambassadors.
- What happens if the issue on snxambassadors.eth is resolved?
Will they relinquish the voting power if the issue with snxambassadors.eth is resolved?
Will the ambassadors control 3.4M voting power (at the time of writing this)?
Will they enact both votes becoming the biggest delegate by far?
This questions need definitive answers.
Edit: it was three folded, not two folded
@MattL tagging you so we get an answer to my questions. Next voting cycle is coming up and we need to have an answer to know where we stand
Hi @MattL (or @mastermojo),
Just bumping this to see if you had an answer on your intentions with this one yet? A few of us (e.g. @Axel_T and @Netrim) have raised the query so it would be great to get your clarification.
Hey there Minimal,
Apologies for the delay. I answered this earlier in the thread, but I am more than happy to clarify.
The Synthetix Ambassadors will be using both wallets and will not be removing the self-delegation once the other wallet is accessible. This was laid out in the original SIP and will be depleted as the Synthetix Treasury uses these for rewards.
Since no other discussion participants were tagged in this reply, I will do so now:
@ScaleWeb3 @katie @OPUser @OPGovWatch @states_of_nature1651 @Jadmat.Eth-DefiLatam @Netrim @MinimalGravitas
And since there were no other replies, I will add mine here:
Based on the full discussion above, I believe that this is nothing short of an arbitrary, non-disclosed, self-serving governance attack on Optimism by the Synthetix Ambassadors.
If I’m not mistaken, from Snapshot you can see that they are starting to vote with this 2.1m OP, and this is yet another reason for community apathy and disempowerment, why OP holders don’t want to get involved in its Governance (or leave quickly), and why a large majority of token holders don’t want to get informed and routinely vote. Why bother when the community is controlled by a few? And the few make up their own rules, to benefit themselves, as they go along?
Bearish for the Optimism Collective and OP …or should the Collective be renamed, the Synthetix Ambassadors Affiliate Grants Program?! Sorry, that’s rude, but this action is shady, and from a group/bundled vote Phase 0 allocation as well
I am spending some time away from Keyboard, so apologies if i missing latest development around this topic.
I am silent on this as there is nothing new to say, I did my best by bringing this topic up for discussion when Perp did it and later with SNX. But as I am tagged, few thoughts.
Those following this conversation from starting are either against it or at least find their approach unethical.
Overriding their Phaso 0 proposal commitment by their internal proposal is wrong and against open governance. Can I, as a protocol, take fund from gov for protocol development and later use it for other reason because I have a written document mentioning the same somewhere in my Discord ?
They are one of the biggest and trusted ecosystem on Optimism and it makes perfect sense that their voice is heard in our governance but the guidelines should come from OF so that it applies equally to all protocol, big or small. What is better and more sustainable, a decision made by a multisig of 3-5 people or a framework and set of rules applicable to everyone equally and fairly. They are already using and voting with their extra 2M, why should a protocol gets a head start compare to others ?
Katie, Minimal, Axlvaz, Netrim and our Latam members raised their voice on this forum as well as on Discord but all we got in Response was “greater good narative” shielded with word ‘community’.
Thank you doing the follow-up and happy holidays.
20 Dec 2022, 06:33 by email@example.com:
Thanks for the reply, OPUser.
Good summary. I agree with your thoughts, and it’s good to know that you and others feel similar uneasiness about this, and have been discussing it more thoroughly when I was absent. Thanks for stating your position.
If there is nothing new, and nothing else to say or can be done, then at least this forum is transparent and may help shape rest-of-community views moving forward. At least I can hold onto that.
Thanks for your ongoing involvement with Optimism. Have a great holiday season, enjoy the time off, and see you in 2023. All the best!
Honestly, I’m really disappointed by this as well, but yea, not sure what more there is to say. In the latest voting round for Citizen House Badgeholder nominations they have used their 2.2M to vote for themselves, and only themselves.
This has means they have simply given themselves a position in the top 10 and therefore a citizenship badge. Again, there were no rules against doing this, but it just seems to continue the pattern of self-serving descisions, which presumably we should expect to continue whenever the opportunity arises.
Like you said above, Synthetix should have a large role in Optimism, they are one of the key protocols around which so much is built… but that power should be allocated by the community as it is for everything else, not just taken by them every time there is no explicit rule preventing it. I’m sure they think it is for the ‘Greater Good’ for them to have as much control as they can, but I fundementally believe it is never a sensible idea to let the powerful decide how much power they should have, even if they really are good actors (which I do think they probably are).
Thanks for the reply, Minimal. Well put.
To change the topic to something more positive: Congratulations on winning your Badge for being in the top 10! I’m only a small token holder but I was happy to vote for you a few days ago, and thus I’m happy to see you and few others I voted for make the Top 10.
So, congrats! I hope you give yourself a good thumbs up, and then go on to enjoy the role & carry it out well.