Retro Funding 6: Bribery Policy

Retro Funding đź”´
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It is expected that Optimists refrain from self-dealing. While opportunities for self-dealing in the Citizens’ House will be reduced via incentive design and voting mechanisms, the Foundation may implement additional measure to discourage self-dealing, to be defined at the beginning of each Round, while these mechanisms are further developed.
The Foundation has defined the below process to address bribery, if needed.

Over time, the consequences for bribery and other forms of self-dealing will be determined by the Citizens’ House and enforced via governance managed Citizenship Criteria.

Round 6 Anti-Bribery Policy

Reporting

  • You may report any verifiable instance of bribery using the form linked here . All discussions and reports should be in accordance with the Rules of Engagement.
  • As onchain evidence of bribery is unlikely, three separate reports against the same briber (or directly affiliated party) will need to be filed for a case to be considered valid. This number is based upon the number of people required for a bribe have a meaningful impact on results and considering the potential disruption of false reports.

Enforcement

  • In the event 3 separate reports are filed, and the briber is another badgeholder, the bribing badgeholder will receive an attestation and be prohibited from participating in Season 6.
  • In the event 3 separate reports are filed, and the briber is a project, the project will receive an attestation and be removed from the Round (ineligible to receive rewards in Round 6).
  • In the event any report is found to be invalid, the badgeholder will receive an attestation and will be ineligible to receive retroactive governance participant rewards for Round 6.

Please note: In the future, governance will decide the set of attestations that permit or prohibit Citizenship.

Subject to Citizens’ House Approval

Before any enforcement action is taken, the Foundation must post a proposal summarizing the reported bribery incident and corresponding enforcement actions. The Citizens’ House will then have one week to veto any enforcement decisions proposed by the Foundation. If an enforcement action suggested by the Foundation is veto’d, no enforcement action will take place. New reports filed about the same instance will not be re-considered.

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Same question as for the self-dealing rule:

Simple majority?

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Moving forward, I’d suggest creating an Anti-Bribery Committee dedicated to overseeing all Retro Funding rounds. This committee should be responsible for implementing anti-bribery guidelines, monitoring for any potential unethical behavior that’s against the code of conducts, and ensuring that all votes are cast without bias or undue influence.

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Attestations are a way forward. But ideally we should have algorithms in place that are helpful in highlighting dubious behaviour/interactions with the collective.

Furthermore I would advocate that based on a “severity” they would be further published to an on-chain registry.

Grants provide a lifeline to many projects and we should be doing our absolute best to remove bad actors from the process.

In terms of a “good enough” system I would optimise for early-detection and sybil resistance.

On a high level I would design as follows:

  • Ensure key data is made available for public participation in algorithm design and analysis
  • Setup an open bounty program that allows public to submit reports for rewards based on severity of detection
  • Having a week to enforce a decision seems short sighted.
  • To open up a claim, one should also be at risk as the claim is potentially reputation damaging. (Depending on the severity, we should scale the stake required to open up a claim)
  • Invalid claims, reporters lose and defendant is given stake

This all seems complicated but if we want our systems to scale I think a lot of these processes need to move on-chain.