Anticapture Commission

[system]

Expectations of the Commission

• This program is best understood as a temporary measure to increase votable supply via delegation to a targeted tokenholder group - similar to what we’ve done with the Protocol Delegation Program and proposed Chain Delegation Program. This is meant to be a short term delegation program that increases the voting power of our highest impact delegates.

• In exchange for receiving this delegation, Commission members will uphold the specified levels of engagement and serve the very important role of bridging communication between the Token House and Citizens’ House.

• The Commission will create this bridge between Houses by filing two types of reports. The Commission has no decision making power in the Citizens’ House; they may only serve as a warning system. Each report requires 4 delegate approval from Commission members to be considered valid. The Citizens’ House may, of course, choose to disregard or disagree with a report.

  Report Type #1: Statement of Concern

  • To be shared with the Citizens’ House when an imbalance in power among tokenholders is arising in the Token House
  • When might this occur?
    • Any one tokenholder can unilaterally meet quorum or pass a proposal
    • A voting block has formed (between protocols or chains, for example) and that voting block can unilaterally meet quorum or pass a proposal
    • There is evidence of bribery or collusion among tokenholders

  Report Type #2: Request for Veto

  • Request for badgeholders to veto a specific proposal
  • When might this occur?
    • A tokenholder has violated the Code of Conduct and voted to pass their own proposal
    • There has been a violation of due process (a protocol upgrade that is not audited, for example) or delegates are unable or have insufficient time to assess the contents of a specific proposal
    • Any of the potential dynamics described under Report Type #1 will determine the outcome of a proposal

• Ideally, these circumstances occur rarely or never, but we believe it is prudent to have an identified process and specified party responsible for alerting the Citizens’ House in the event these issues do arise. Of course, anyone in the DAO could also play this role (even with the existence of the Commission), but the Commission creates an easily identifiable group of high context delegates to entrust with this responsibility.

• What if the Commission gets captured?

  • The delegation amount of 10M OP is intended to limit the possibility that the Commission could effectively capture the Token House, especially as votable supply increases
  • Commission votes will be cast according to a simple majority of all members. Individual votes should be publicly recorded (likely via Snapshot). As outlined in the Code of Conduct, members must not vote for their own proposals. Any capture of the Commission among members should be transparent and visible and may result in the removal of members violating the Code of Conduct.
  • The Commission has no ability to effectuate outcomes in the Citizens’ House, it can only make recommendations to the Citizens’ House.

• Measures of success (thankt you for the suggestion to define this; it is something we would like to start doing for all Reflection Period proposals starting in Season 6.)

  • Goals of the Commission:
    • Increase votable supply: This is important to the resiliency of the system and the impact of this program on votable supply is known in advance
      • Alternatives: Airdrops, token grants, other delegation programs such as the Protocol Delegation Program or Chain Delegation Program, etc.
    • Define and uphold standards for top delegates: Does the Commission help refine standards for top delegate impact?
      • Alternative: A recognized delegate program in which top delegates are rewarded based on participation measures with no additional mandate
    • Retention of top individual delegates as OP Chains and protocols gain voting power: Do we retain our highest impact delegates over the next 12 months?
      • Alternative: Top delegates churn, continued efforts to increase delegation to high impact delegates organically
    • Establish a process and bridge for communication between Token House and Citizens’ House: Does the Commission result in established processes and useful communication lines between Houses?
      • Alternative: Leave this process undefined and fulfilled by unidentified delegates if/when an issue arises
  • Commission success should not be evaluated based on the number of reports filed or the amount of communication had with the Citizens’ House

• The main alternative to this program is increasing the votable supply organically, which we are working on in tandem.

• At the end of Season 6, it would be very interesting to do an analysis on whether any of the temporary delegation programs (Protocol Delegation Program, Chain Delegation Program, and/or the Anticapture Commission) were effective in increasing participation from the targeted tokenholder groups (as measured by voting participation during the program and retention thereafter).

Thank you for engaging in a very productive conversation around the Commission.