Special Voting Cycle #31a Decisions
Below, we present the rationale from the SEED Gov delegation for our voting during Special voting cycle#31a.
Due to the ambitious and complex nature of the final objective, having a single, unified intent is a positive step. However, the tangible benefits will likely emerge around mid-Season 8, as interoperability is expected to roll out toward the end of Season 7.
We find the Scope Reduction particularly interesting: the decrease from 18 to 9 members reflects lessons learned from the previous season. We’re eager to see how this new structure plays out, especially with role migrations to other councils—Audit reviews moving to the DAB and the creation of the M&M Council as a separate entity.
That said, there are a few points we’re not fully comfortable with:
1. Lead Compensation (1): 35,000 OP – Although it’s noted as “the same as Season 6,” this could cause confusion. In Season 5, the Token House approved 30,000 OP for the Lead and 10,000 OP for Ops. Technically, the Lead’s allocation was 30,000 OP, not 35,000, regardless of the specific circumstances that led to the higher payment.
2. RetroFunding Budget – We find this allocation somewhat problematic. If several councils are not applying for Retro Funding due to difficulties in measuring the Grants Council’s impact, as well as the unpredictability of the rounds, it points to a flaw in the design of Retro Funding itself.
3. Reporting Standards – While Cycle Reports are required, we believe the council should produce a final report with metrics** rather than just an End-of-Season Retrospective filled with reflections.
4. Reserve Budget – We need better systems for tracking workflows to ensure that any use of the additional reserve budget aligns with actual workload and priorities.
We see value in the formalization of this council as an independent council separate from the Grants Council. Maintaining the same budgets as Season 6—Milestones and Metrics Reviewers (3): 25,000 OP each and Milestones and Metrics Lead (3): 20,000 OP each—seems reasonable. The Retroactive Funding Reserve Bonus: 20,000 OP (new for S7) is also noteworthy. Since the M&M Council will not apply for RetroFunding, citing the long timeframe (a year or more) needed to observe results and the difficulty of quantifying their impact, this highlights a broader issue: RetroFunding may need adjustments to better align with governance processes.
Although there is a nearly 200% budget increase compared to Season 5, and no benchmarks were provided relative to similar budgets in other DAOs, we believe the Security Council remains an essential entity. It will serve as a critical safeguard for all chains in the Superchain.
The DAB’s expanded responsibilities—including selecting applicants for Foundation Missions and actively shaping these missions—justify the proposed changes. The increase in the Lead’s compensation (30,000 OP, +5,000 OP from last season) seems reasonable.
Other improvements include:
- The addition of the Audit Request Team (2): 12,500 OP each (a reduction of 2,500 OP from the Grants Council budget).
- The introduction of the Mission Scouts (2) role.
We also see value in the inclusion of a detailed explanation of the DAB’s assessment of protocol upgrades. This shift, shared by the Lead, eliminates the need for the “Upgrade Czar” role. However, we believe that the non-technical summaries are very useful and should not be replaced.
The decision to exclude RetroFunding participation (similar to the Grants Council and M&M Council) while assigning a Bonus Payment of 50,000 OP—the same amount awarded through RetroPGF in Season 6—again underscores a need to revisit and refine the RetroFunding model.
We expect this council’s role will gain importance as new chains and participants with significant voting power join the governance. Seasons 5 and 6 were a good training for the ACC to consolidate and fulfill its role at the level expected.
We see these as valid experiments. Before interoperability goes live on the Superchain, these missions will help ensure the ecosystem is well-prepared for smooth and robust adoption.
We are not entirely convinced that this is the right way to go, but we support the Collective’s sentiment. We believe that the dissolution of this Council in terms of decentralization of resolution-making is a step backward and that there was an opportunity to make adjustments to get to a point that would work better for everyone.
An important consideration:
We want to express our concern regarding the current budgets that include a Retro Funding allocation this season. While this is clearly a response to the suboptimal Retro Funding system, which appears to be one of the drivers behind this strategy, it doesn’t make sense given the original purpose of optimal allocation. Governance retro-rewards should be decided and controlled by external actors, not pre-included in the budget proposal without any safeguards.*