Season 2 Feedback Thread

I appreciate people are busy so I will write short:

  1. Slow the heck down. We are spending too much money, too fast. This is too much work for the committees.
  2. As a commitee member I have to say that yes itā€™s unpleasant to be in one. And if we use the ā€œoh but you are compensatedā€ for this excuse fuck that ā€¦ I donā€™t need it. Committee members gets blamed for everything. Slow responses, proposal rejections, not enough feedback, not being online enough etc.
  3. Taking the compensation further, I donā€™t think committees and delegate should be much different. Delegates should also be compensated as they are doing a lot of work too. Reading a commiteeā€™s recommendation and agreeing or not, while comparing to the original proposal is not trivial. Now multiply that by 20 proposals and you got a full time job.
  4. I personally found commitees helpful. Annoying to be in one, but for the proposals that were not for the tooling committee I almost always went with the recommendation. And it felt good.
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Thanks for the explanation. Iā€™ll follow the RD program on MAKER. Iā€™m also reading about the MAKER endgame proposal. It may be a positive step for OP, but I have a feeling that in the long term something else is needed. There is a missing peace that we need to find through experimentation.

Firstly, I have read some of your post and itā€™s great to see a few people on OP caring about the values and expressing their points of view with honesty and humbleness.

Iā€™m glad you point out the low token holders participation. This is a critical point for me. I believe we need to spread the word about the importance of the OP collective governance experiment. This is not only DeFi (thatā€™s why I keep talking about the bias) this is about an oportunity to change the world in a lot of ways.
Iā€™ve been spreading the work on some Spanish forums and I brought a few people to the protocol by sending them some ETH to claim the NFT, and I helped a friend to claim his airdrop and delegate before the snatpshot. Itā€™s not easy, but Iā€™ll keep trying to find a way for community engagement. This is the personal relationship approach I believe in, but is so much time-consuming and hard to compete with mass media marketing and trends.

I love this proactive behavior and what you say about data is essential. Nice job

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@GFXlabs @Bobbay_StableLab and @fig are all recognized delegates with Maker (also members of DeFi committee A) and I have been with Maker since 2018 so we have some experience with this. The recognized delegate system is similar to what I was envisioning for OP delegates. We already have delegate profiles, I think the only missing piece would be to apply performance metrics for compensation that could include voting frequency, communication and amount delegated. Iā€™m looking forward to hearing more ideas and feedback on this topic during the reflection period!

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From a free-market perspective, DAOs and OP Token House should follow free-for-all mechanisms. I deeply believe decision making should be achieved by consensus and not because people put trust in few members/delegates. We all know achieving consensus is hard but itā€™s how DAOs make any sense at all. We donā€™t need DAOs to replace hierarchical organizations.

That said, Iā€™m happy if we end the committees experiment in this season and we reward/incentive participation using objective and subjective metrics.

Starting fromā€¦

This is what I would like to see in the future (next season)ā€¦

Free-for-All Governance Paradigm

  1. No hierarchical power, delegates and non-delegates have the same status, power and voice.
  2. Proposals should incorporate a ā€œtemperature checkā€ poll to move to the next phase (voting phase or something else before that).
  3. Token House Members will receive ā€œPointsā€ for every measurable action (objective metrics).
  4. Points are converted at the end of each season into a payment and/or NFT (using a subjective ratio voted at the end of the season). This payment can be claimed (following previous rules, KYC for money/OP, ā€¦) or reverted to the DAO if not claimed.

Governance Phases

I guess this season revealed the less layers we have in the Governance Process better it is for everyone. We can keep Voting phases on a regular base but we need to simplify this process. Using ā€œtemperature checksā€ and a fixed N amount of votes (25, 50, 100 I donā€™t really know but it canā€™t be a low number) to move proposals to the last phase (voting) can work.

Even if the proposal doesnā€™t look ready (ideally only members with ā€œsome activityā€ should be able to vote to avoid fake accounts), even if thereā€™s not enough iteration/feedback, at the end voters will make their choice. If thereā€™s enough feedback and even some analysis of pros and cons (whatever) better it is for the proposal. In the free-for-all logic, members willing to help the governance process should create their own analysis/review post on Proposals they want to focus. Considering engagement of that post they will receive points (that will be converted in some sort of payment at end of season). Thereā€™s some competition aspect in this, if N members (delegates or not) create their own analysis of the same proposal the ones with more likes will receive more points. Difference in this competition is people isnā€™t competing against each other but competing to make their reviews more useful to everyone in the Governance. Btw, this also requires a new forum structure with sub-categories for every cycle to make everything cleaner.

Objective Metrics

I like to use hybrid versions of this objective metrics, for instance instead of 1 reply/comment = 1 point, I like to think replies without a single like arenā€™t useful at all (meaning they will get zero points). I will just share some metrics as example and we can go from there (if people like the concept).

  • Proposal comments/replies: Every 5 likes gives 1 point => likes / 5
    • 1 comment with 5 likes = 1 point;
    • 2 Likes + 2 Likes + 1 like in different comments = 0.4 + 0.4 + 0.2 = 1 point;
    • btw, 5 can be replaced with any value. I think 5 is fine since we donā€™t have much engagement but we can even change this value for each season.
  • Review Posts/Topics: Using all likes on the post and comments seems fair, avoiding using the same exact ratio letā€™s say 7 likes = 1 point => (likes on comments and post) / 7
    • Post creator (proposal reviewer) will receive points not based on the amount of replies (to avoid spam) but instead based on the quality measurable by users feedback (likes). Sure this can be gamed but thatā€™s why we still need some subjective metrics at the end to filter/remove/ignore ā€œattacksā€.
  • I donā€™t follow discord at all but similar rules can be applied and tracked on discord. Also, since I donā€™t have a clue if people will like to follow something like this I will stop here (for now). Nonetheless thereā€™s plenty of metrics we can use to give points to DAO members.

Subjective Metrics

This reply is longer than what I would like so I will end with this note: Subjective metrics should allow us the fight spam, unfairness in some objective metrics and more.

Small Update ā†’ This subjective metrics can range from ratios to convert points into OP/Whatever to something like ignoring/voiding points from some posters (fake accounts), topics, whatever. From my perspective, subjectivity is always needed to prevent abuse/attacks (itā€™s not to replace objective metrics but instead to improve their effectiveness).

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First season it was Leftrissjp with Infinity wallet proposal, then we saw it happening with Katieā€™s committee, shortly after that honor was mine and now I see the torch has passed to Poylnya.

Some of us were motivated to join this Gov because of its alignment towards public good, for others supporting a fully EVM compatible L2 is like supporting Ethereum and we want to see both succeed, lastly I think few were dragged towards Optimism Governance because of our two pillar governance model.

Feedback is quite important for any discussion, gov or in general, DAO or distributed co-ordination is chaotic and difficult. But we should not break the barrier between engagement and harassment. Some of the delegates has many thing on their plate and still they choose to be part of us, part of this governance and we should be grateful for their time and effort.

So think, is it worth pushing them away just because they dont agree with your opinion. Thoughts ?

1 Like

sorry, donā€™t follow - exactly where is polynya being harrassed, and how?

actually think, now that weā€™re getting more data coming in, that we should start tracking outcomes of grants that delegates have greenlit

Encouraging activity is certainly a crucial one (and thereā€™s a big gap that needs to be filled!), but weā€™ve now done enough cycles to where delegators can start getting a more complete picture of what their delegated OP has been facilitating

not suggesting that there be an explicit ā€˜evaluationā€™, to be clear, but it seems a natural extension of the reports they give when placing votes

By any chance did you publish this in the wrong Thread?

While I understand what you mean I donā€™t understand why itā€™s published here.

Initially I thought of sharing it on Community Mottos Brainstorm thread but I realize that this thread is more active and although my concern is related to overall gov, it has increased significantly in season 2, so shared it here.

I donā€™t understand who needs/should answer this question.
Iā€™m sure itā€™s not directed to me since I believe everyone matters.

Got it, paraphrased it. It was not directed towards anyone in particular, more of conservation started, a temp-check to see if I am the only one sharing those thoughts and If not then what we can do to improve this going forward.

To be fair I think we reached some consensus about that and more things, this is my recap (can be wrong but itā€™s how I interpreted many comments):

  • Committees arenā€™t that good for this Governance;
  • Something needs to change (with or without committees);
  • Many people feel disappointed and donā€™t want the fights going over and over;
  • We need more evaluation/analysis on what we achieved in order to improve/redirect grants.

Edit to highlight this because Iā€™m not adding anything new, just rewording/resuming things ā€¦

That said, we now should focus on solutions. I did my best to present an alternative but I will not push this free-for-all concept (eventually the RD solution isnā€™t that bad but I would like to see delegates and non delegates at the same level, otherwise I donā€™t expect much engagement from non delegates). I guess we will find some sort of consensus in the chaos but focusing on solutions should be a priority (if thereā€™s nothing else new to add).

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Would it be possible to institute a short ā€œfrozen periodā€ before voting begins? It can be difficult to justify (or even organize) giving all proposals on the forum a thorough read prior to voting because 1) itā€™s not always clear which will be voted upon immediately vs go through feedback incorporation or be abandoned, 2) proposals can and have changed materially in the final days leading up to a vote.

Because most proposals require at least some minimal due diligence (Does this project exist? Do I understand what this protocol/company does? Verifying basic facts and metrics stated in the proposal, etc) itā€™s a bit of a scramble to get through large numbers of polls. Having even two or three days of knowing for sure which will be up for a vote and in what form would be very helpful!

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Hello,

Ok, iā€™m gonna try this now. Iā€™m a small wallet holder, first timer and came to optimism trough my own defi journey touching almost all chains where gas feeā€™s were on a level i could afford them (non mainnetā€¦) .
Iā€™m not on optimism from an idealogical perspective of governance, I donā€™t know all the history, and i am because i think longer term i can optimize my returns here.
And iā€™m locked in longer term because i locked my funds in Velo due to the OP drop on 10K lock combined with good return on bribes. From there i explored Syntehtics stack, Quix, Sonne, OpenX, etc. So now iā€™m in I thought lets try & comment

As a smaller wallet holder, i think;

  1. Its pretty complex to participate to governance & also a bit intimidating. thereā€™s a lot of material to read and conflicting opinions + discussions on different topics are in same channels in discord + all those seemingly smart people. For me simple things would help like a channel per proposal so i can read up on just the proposals i have interest in / the ones i feel i have a bit more knowledge about. Discord is for me the easiest way of comms

  2. Youā€™re spending millions & basically running an investment fund, my rl job is with a company and when i spend those amounts i need to report weekly on the progress of returns. you can demand 1-5% of a grant must be used for reporting of results. You can demand more sophiticated grant requests where funds are realased in batches based on KPI achievements

  3. I can imagine delegates need compensation, this increases quality. In my view, this compensation should come from a balance between their portolio performance (eg Defi, NFT, etc.) & OP token performance. I think this creates accountability & quality + delegates need to have skin in the game in my view (my assumption is each delegate also holds significant amounts of OP?). What i do find extra complex, in my normal job i sign for the fact i do not work / share info with competitors; this line is more blurred in defi I understand but i feel uncomfortable with delegates who also hold large bags/interest on other, especially competing, chains

  4. I think it makes sense to do a periodical reset of delegations; like once per year delegations are reset and need to be re-committed; this requires activite desicion making. Nearly every political entity re-elects its leaders periodically and votes are not carried over in this process

  5. I would love to see a strategy behind grant allocation (+ this strategy made transparant) and voting on metrics related to that strategy. eg if strategy is to aquire non-mercenary capital, incentivize long term lock in of strategic assets (eg long term btc lock ins) etc. With a transparant strategy, it becomes easier for anyone to evaluate the proā€™s/conā€™s of a grant and thereby contribute to governance

Those are my top of mind thoughts. hope it helps. In the end, i just hope for quality so i know the funds I committed for longer term are going to grow.

best

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Grant Funding Process:
I think many would agree that we are still in the early experiential stages here and as such still trying to figure out how to get the most ROI from this pool of $OP funding. As we collect more and more data about performance of past proposals we find what does and does not work. An example of this is retroactive airdrops do not seem to be the best use of $OP from this fund based on the data.

In order to avoid inefficient use of $OP funding in these early stages I suggest we begin to increase the snapshot vote approval threshold based on the amount of $OP requested. Like so:

  • Less than x,xxx,xxx $OP | Approval Threshold = 51%
  • Greater than x,xxx,xxx $OP | Approval Threshold = xx%
  • Greater than x,xxx,xxx $OP | Approval Threshold = xx%

And I order to reduce risk and facilitate accountability I suggest we tranche $OP distribution for approved proposals and ensure each distribution tranche is gated by a milestone that is explicitly stated in the proposal.

The above are of course just ideas meant for feedback and ideation so please thoughts and feedback encouraged.

Committee Leanings:
I actually really enjoyed being a part of a committee as the NFT and Gaming Committee had a relatively light workload (I totally understand this was the exact opposite case for everyone else)

The relatively light workload really allowed our committee as a team to heavily engage with the proposal submitters which facilitated some really great ideation on the proposal which I think will ultimately result in these proposals having a higher likelihood of success.

If we do ultimately decide to disband committees which I am fine with I still think it is incredibly valuable for projects to feel as if they have an entity/group they feel represented by and can go to for guidance as for many projects I know governance can sometimes be unapproachable.

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Hi everyone,

Ross here from a16z. This is a great thread that thoughtfully highlights a number of areas for improvement moving forward. Weā€™ve noticed that delegate and delegator (token holder) engagement is a recurring theme across both this thread and others. Most other protocols have also faced token holder and delegate apathy, implementing a variety of mechanisms and UX designs in an attempt to solve these issues.

Voter apathy is a governance problem that crypto may be uniquely suited to address. We offer two primary areas through which to improve voter engagement via delegation. When both areas are addressed, they can have a compounding effect on increasing delegation rates.

1. User Interface

The average user should be able to delegate to an active delegate via the simplest workflow possible to encourage delegation. A separate proposal to fund a professional UX design analysis may be appropriate to address this design problem with data-based rigor.

2. Incentivization

As others in this thread have addressed, economic incentivization is a powerful tool to encourage user engagement. Many forms of incentivization and funding sources have already been listed in this thread. We will merely add to those suggestions that providing predictability is a powerful mechanism to reduce apathy. For example, a short one week campaign to encourage delegation via economic incentives (or re-delegation, if your current delegate is not active) every ~three months provides predictability to voters that is reflected in traditional civic governance models. When token holders only need to pay attention a few times a year, know when those times are and are economically incentivized, they are much more likely to participate.

After solving for delegation apathy, incentive mechanisms can also increase participation amongst delegates. In addition to the incentivization ideas and recommendations previously listed in this thread, this article from a16z crypto thoroughly explains a mechanism that is intended to get people to honestly report how costly they find it to vote and then pays a defined subset of voters that find voting least costly to actually vote: Paying People to Participate in Governance - a16z crypto

Overall, itā€™s great to see the depth of feedback here and we are excited to see how Optimismā€™s governance model continues to evolve. Looking forward to everyoneā€™s thoughts and continued discussion!

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Where to learn more and/or get involved with "Reflection Period"s? Thanks

so good. It is important to discuss this

One of the best activities! I love idea with quests :star_struck:!

My personal opinion. A lot of other crypto companies have had these issues and there have been a number of solutions. The biggest problem as I see it, is that OP is a layer 2, and the coin we use to do everything is ETH. This leaves us with limited us cases for the OP coin, and thus people just hold the coin in their wallet and forget about it. For this reason, we need to institute measures that increase token velocity of OP, as well bring in more community engagement. For these needs and circumstances I propose the following actions:

Institute real yield staking- At first the staking can be inflationary, then maybe transition into a combination of inflation and real yield rewards, and then eventually all the revenue provided to stakers is from money generated from real yield. This would give the token a dividend that would make it a useful asset to hold, but will also make it useful in all sort of DEFI applications. Staking will also take supply off the market. 6 month lock upā€™s are a smart idea as well. I think a good example of this would be GMXā€™s staking portal.

Another option is an algorythmic stable coin backed by the OP token. A good example of this could be SNXā€™s SUSD. The stable coin could be seperate or part of the main staking.

You attach a launchpad for OP stakers- basically stakers get airdrops and IDOā€™s of new tokens that launch on OP. ATOM and CARDANO are good examples of this.

Exclusive NFTā€™s that can only be bought with OP. Maybe burn OP in the process.

Finally, governance is hard. I think it is more efficient to copy SNXā€™s goverance model. In this model, stakers elect a council and the council is paid, and the council makes all the decisions. This allows the stakers to elect specialists that can become knowledgable in issues and make the best decisions when voting. We should divert whatever revenue is necessary to have a properly functioning council.

I love OP.