As much as I would like to address all falsehoods and misleading comments, I’ll not address them here for the sake of keeping the thread on topic, and to respect the time of the mods and delegates. For anyone interested in digging further, you can read the Giveth thread, ask me or anyone else involved directly. We’d love to clarify any misunderstanding or clear out any questions you might have.
I’d like to emphasize that no matter which direction you decide to take, I agree it makes lots of sense to use mechanism design and cryptoeconomic incentives to offer a (very small) barrier of entry that works as the first filter for applicants - that can be very accommodating too. To make the barrier very small for legitimate entries, it could use crowdfunding for the deposit, a vouch system, or exemptions if the applicant already has onchain reputation that is relevant to the application.
There’s certainly a lot to explore in this area, and it could save a lot of time for delegates, and also promote the use of web3 native tools. Glad to brainstorm!
Mandatory (Violation 2): Optimists must not make personal attacks on the opinions or merits of proposal authors or any other party engaging in governance activity. Optimists must not make unsubstantiated claims to advocate for or against any proposal or proposal author. Delegates may make inquiries to proposal authors to validate or collect information. Whistleblowing is not a violation of the Code of Conduct. More details on the whistleblowing process will be available soon.
Recommended: Optimists should provide constructive feedback supported by high quality and well researched arguments.
I was thinking about how we could help with the problem addressed by @Michael regarding the importance of aligning incentives across all participants in the Retro PGF submission process (OP foundation employees, Badge holders, OP community, and submitters).
I wrote a first draft of the curation system I was thinking about (note that is a first version of the idea, so all guidelines and parameters might need adjustments).
Also, I deployed yesterday the List mentioned simulating a Retro PGF 4 curated list on Goerli so you can see how it would look like (eventually we could also create a frontend for OP Retro PGF).
Everyone can take a look at it here and can upload/challenge a project using Goerli Eth (let me know if you require some).
I think it’s important to outline that the list could be created with any parameter;
For example, if you want to make it extremely flexible with the only objective of avoiding spam or scammy projects. (meaning that all other projects non-scammy/spam, even with a minor contribution could enter the list). After that, the badge holders will analyze the submissions, but without scammy/spam projects (and hopefully, without needing the intervention of the OP foundation resources)
Please, Let me know your thoughts and feedback, or any questions you might have.
Hi! Been reading the forum for a while but I felt I needed to create an account to chip in. Even though this is not related to the topic, I find it relevant to the interests of the Optimism Collective to talk about this serious matter. My motivation to join is because I have seen enough interactions of Kleros comms people across many different platforms to know a pattern when I see it. My only and last message will be this.
My only contribution to this thread is that before embarking into anything regarding Kleros you can go out and about doing research but in the end it all boils down to the following research kit and this is the only thing you need to go and research:
What is the distribution of their native token, the PNK?
How decentralized is it? What proportion of unstaked token belongs to founders/devs? Has there been any disclosure or enquiry about this in the past?
What sort of environment would you find when litigation is incentivized and anonymous vigilantes would reap the rewards without anyone knowing who is actually the judge and who is the attorney?
The basis for their whole system is the idea that a rational actor in a “juror” setting, without knowing the decision of another actor will favour logic when not knowing what the others will decide. How this plays out in their system, if the votes of other actors are made on-chain for everyone to see? (someone will cite a “commit-reveal scheme” which was, AFAIK, never implemented, and their research lead even considered it non-viable, see https://youtu.be/ov_FFoT6pfE?t=484).
Losing a stake if you don’t get funding, especially considering the stringent requirements to meet in order to get any funding is quite strict.
Okay 10 OP is not that much but still it’s hurtful for projects that legit tried to apply and gotten nothing out of the process.
If a stake was to be used, I would only slash a stake for projects deemed as spam, or somehow breaking rules. Not everyone who does not get funding as it’s a double insult. Not only do you tell them “their impact” is not enough. But you also slash them. Ouch …
Or just go back to the previous system. And use nominations. That was a much much cleaner system than this FFA system we have now.
Yeah would be much better to restrict to nominations only, looking at the total number of applications thats quite a large undertaking for badgeholders.
I’d like to add a suggestion regarding Privacy and Transparency During Voting: It’s crucial to maintain privacy during the voting process. For example, in the RetroPGF Discord channel , there have been recent protests because some projects were removed, which has left some badgeholders uncertain about the review process. But don’t worry, hopefully, the foundation can provide or enhance commenting access for badgeholders, and transparently explain how these projects received their funding. This would assist badgeholders in voting with confidence and avoiding conflicts.
I actually mention something regarding the crowdfunding here:
Basically, it would be great to align incentives together with economic security in which all actors (submitters, crowdfunders and badge holders) get a benefit from it.
And something like a small % from the grant to Crowdfunders of those projects who have no OP (or Eth) for the deposit might work.
“Eventually, if OP doesn’t want to exclude submitters with no $ for deposits, there could be a crowdfunding mechanism where users provide funding for the Curate deposit for projects, and in the case of getting OP tokens from the retroactive grant, the crowdfunder could get a small % of that grant, aligning incentives.”
