So after browsing through this thread I am left with more questions than answers, at this point I don’t know if the issue was Perp delegating their OP tokens or because it was not explicitly stated in their proposal?
I am of the opinion that protocols should participate in governance, and in fact, think that the token house is indeed vulnerable to governance attacks down the road if the major protocols living on it are not active participants of governance.
If the issue is that they didn’t explicitly state it in their proposal that they plan to delegate their idle OP from phase 0, I think it’s too early to judge them on it since they haven’t clearly violated their original proposal. Now if they were to never distribute their OP allocation and strictly use the OP to vote for more OP tokens for them selves or something that would constitute a governance attack. I reject @polynya’s insinuation that this is a “de-facto governance attack” in it’s current form and would invite the other active delegates of this forum to tone down their rhetoric as well.
The precedent being set here is that if a project were to make any changes to their token distribution plan from the governance fund, that they are violating OP governance and should be blacklisted in the token house. So what if a project decides to re-direct incentives within their allocation or re-design their token distribution plan in light of new data or a lack of effectiveness in the original incentives plan? Are we to say that anything not explicitly stated in the original proposal is deemed a mis-use of funds? After reading this thread I am unable to gauge the sentiment around those things.
On a another note, with the sheer volume of proposals coming through, I don’t find it reasonable that the fate of all those proposals be decided by an extremely small portion of the voting supply and by the handful of delegates who are active here. Personally I have more faith in Perp Protocol’s delegate voting genuinely and beneficially for the token house than I do in some random delegates who “like Optimism” but have no real tangible incentive alignment with Optimism.
To sum things up, I would appreciate some clarity from those who had strong feelings on this topic to detail what the main concerns are, so at least there is some consensus to go off after reading this long thread.