This proposal doesn’t specify the proposer parameter. Only canceller, executer, and admin. I assume that the proposer role will be the governor contract, but it should be specified here. Also, if the executor is the governor contract, then wouldn’t the token house have to vote twice for each treasury execution? Once to propose to the timelock, and once to actually execute. Unless there’s some Timelock execution function on the governor contract that allows some class of delegates to execute a timelock proposal. Also, if the canceller is the governor contract, then we have a similar issue. If it typically takes 7 days to get a vote through, then there will realistically never be a way for the collective to make emergency cancellations of treasury transfers.
Another question: does the foundation have any veto privileges of treasury executions? The way this proposal reads, I would assume no. But I want to clarify to make sure.
This proposal seems underspecified for the seriousness of this step towards decentralization in my opinion. Will probably be voting against (on behalf of Blockchain@USC).