This is a great callout - I personally agree that NFT project usage seemed the least captured from these metrics, and I think it’s important to make note of that for Phase 1. I would definitely encourage OP Collective governance to push to fill in this gap during Phase 1 and actively stimulate NFT ecosystem growth.
ZipSwap appears to also be deployed on Arbitrum 1 (though liquidity is pretty limited) which I believe would make it ineligible for the Optimism Native multiplier.
On-chain metrics (like TVL) are only relevant for Phase 0, which makes up just 15% of the overall Governance Fund / OP Stimpack. Phase 1 will distribute the remaining 85%.
In Phase 1, any project on Optimism can apply for funding. We expect this stage to be more flexible and, as Kevin mentioned, it should fill in the gaps left by Phase 0.
Projects from the original retroactive public goods funding should have a voice and be considered in Phase 0. You can take 10.000.000 from the (231,928,234) OP and distribute it with the same % as the original retroactive funding.
We face a problem where governance and liquidity are in the same token.
If project A goes to phase 1 to ask for OP tokens, they are asking for liquidity to keep the project running. Nonetheless, this Project A should have also OP tokens with no obligation to be allocated but instead, be used for governance. (make them soulbond if you like)
Generally agree with the sentiment to consider metrics on a more subjective basis from Phase 1. TVL and transactions/day both favour a certain type of protocol. You can have a very valuable protocol that has no TVL and only requires people to make transactions occasionally that could be very valuable. At a later date, I’d like to see subjective ratings by OP citizens (and also more empirical usage metrics by them).
Phase 1 airdrop should start after the snapshot of the first airdrop in phase zero instead of waiting for a period of time to start again, which is unfair to those who missed the first airdrop of phase zero airdrop recently and is not good for user loyalty.
Is it a conflict of interest for OP Team members to build, under their own name, on OP? The context of this question is that Team members may have advanced notice on future funding criteria’s, and can capitalize and incentivize users into their own projects. However, I also do see honest value space for Team members to independently build (if they have any extra time).
For instance, if a new physical city was being built, many initial developers have ties to the founding of that city itself. Those developers may open libraries, universities, banks, etc, all to benefit the general public. At some point the developers placement and access may begin to shift from help to control.
This is a good point, IMO this happens to almost every DAO too. They start with a few in control and as the project grows the DAO starts to open its governance to new members until it becomes decentralized. I don’t mind trusting OP devs in the beginning if they follow this path.
Continuing with the discussion about the preponderance of TVL, for phase 1 it would be interesting to take into account the WAU metric (weekly active users), which can help marketplaces, games, bridges and trading protocols to be eligible for incentives in a fairer way.