I fully agree with @katie’s comments except I’d be open to committees continuing as long as there are improvements to the process given community feedback. I did feel it reduced my workload as a delegate, especially for areas where I didn’t have expertise.
Alot of good points posted above.
I also think anonymous feedback questionnaires should be sent to out to protocols that made it to the voting stage, and received OP grants to ensure constructive feedback is received.
I often hear in private DMs how the deadlines are not visible for protocols applying for a grant, and they often rely on the delegates to keep them updated (I have done this many times since OP governance has started).
I have been away camping for a bit (hence the ETH pump I guess…) and have been thinking about our governance system while offline, I came back with lots of points to raise but to be honest you’ve laid out almost exactly what I wanted to say.
Since introducing committees we’ve seen much less engagement, with less names on Discord and here, as well as a complete change in the vibes, with a huge amount of negativity and at times what seems like targeted harassment, with certain members of the losing committee using their large Twitter accounts to poison opinion of members they disagree with. I would assume that this contributes to the reduction in engagement from other community members who simply do not want to be involved in the drama that is so different from the first season.
The compensation going only to committee members is, as again you have stated, probably a factor in reduced engagement as well. Perhaps rather than dividing the community into committee members and non-members a simpler way to manage compensation would be via something like Coordinape, so anyone who had something of value to add to evaluations could be rewarded for it, this would incentivize useful discussion in proposal threads and mean that delegates who don’t want to put the time into reviewing certain proposals themselves could just read the discussion here and be fairly safe in assuming that the rest of the community would have dug into it and pulled out valuable considerations, because they would be retroactively rewarded for doing so.
The only two issues I see here would be whether everyone receiving any reward via Coordinape would need to be KYC’d, and how to avoid sockpuppets and Sybils. I guess that in that case the former would kind of solve for the latter!
Regarding accountability I agree that segmented payouts, linked to KPIs in some way would make sense. Projects could include these KPIs in the proposals and delegates can evaluate these as part of their assessments. This would leave it up to the proposers to find the balance between impressive sounding KPI targets, with the risk of not meeting them, or to make more modest expectations on future performance which could mean their proposal is less enticing in the first place.
TL:DR; basically exactly what you said, but a little less eloquently!
I appreciate the openness and confirmation of what I also believe/think.
From my view once we introduce hierarchical status/power we can only expect people to fight for it (if they want to get to that level). It’s the human nature… voting power is already controversial enough, we shouldn’t need another hierarchy on top of that.
That said, removing the status and power I don’t see as many issues with “Working Groups” or Community Members paid to put time and effort in the governance process. If we have enough individuals helping proposers and giving some analysis of the proposal (let’s say pros and cons, it doesn’t/shouldn’t be yes/no) they deserve some compensation for that work, I’m fine with that as far as people don’t need to “fight for it”.
Paying individuals/groups to do something means everyone else will not care/worry as much about it, someone will do the work (aka “they get paid for that”). Nevertheless it’s not the only reason, as example the more I see people fighting because they don’t like a committee recommendation less I want to be involved.
You have put my feelings in a better way. I also think accountability is a must in grant recipients along with other two points you mentioned @katie.
Thanks for the write-up @katie. I outlined some of my thoughts:
I agree that Committees should not continue into the next season. I hope we can learn from their shortcomings during the upcoming reflection period (and potentially longer), with the goal of reintroducing a more effective Committee system in the future.
At Devcon, I was able to speak with delegates and some Committee members, and many were quick to express their dissatisfaction with the current process. Most complaints were about the review periods being too short, conflicts of interest arising between some committee members and grant applicants, and the pressure that is put on Committee members, all of whom are part-time and unpaid.
Presently, the primary responsibility of the Collective is to decide where to allocate OP which brings a large burden on part-time Committee members who essentially became gatekeepers of a multi-million dollar treasury overnight.
With few exceptions (maybe only Overtime?), Committee recommendations were in line with the winning side of votes. They have a major impact on the entire proposal process but we can clearly see them pressed for time, often submitting proposal approvals and recommendations only hours or minutes before they are due. We should seriously consider extending the Voting Cycles.
My biggest concern was one raised on the most recent Governance call: 20% of the entire Governance Fund was used in the first 140 days of the Collective’s existence. And while Optimism has grown across every metric during that period and incentives certainly helped, a large number of OP grants were misused or even outright misappropriated.
The Collective needs to put together an urgent response and start running a tighter ship with the treasury. The reality is that sustainable apps/projects can succeed on Optimism without incentives, and the Collective should generally grant smaller and smaller amounts to fewer and fewer projects as time progresses. On this week’s call, a rep from @GFXlabs put it bluntly when they said we “are not currently being good stewards” of the treasury, and I have to agree with them.
There are dozens of examples of blockchains/dapps that wasted large treasuries on a few months of incentives. Optimism is incredibly important for the future of Ethereum and we cannot allow governance to follow a short-sighted path.
I think the personal attacks and overall animosity that arose in this forum and Discord over the last few months are unacceptable. Thankfully it seems the majority of delegates rose above the nonsense.
This may come across as harsh but it’s all out of love, I may be a smol delegate but have been in this community for a while and am concerned with the direction things are heading. I remain a capital “O” Optimist and continue to build on Optimism every day.
I’ve made a great effort to catch up with the OP governance process. More users participation is needed (not only delegates). I have been providing some feedback as part of the community, but not expecting any airdrop, just because I like this. That’s called intrinsic motivation and is stronger than any other.
I posted a proposal a week ago and no feedback at all. Is not the only one:
I don’t see how this scenario is going to invite new people to participate.
Sure, I can tell some delegates care about the work they’re doing and deserve it. But much more delegates are needed and community members working with them. The committee’s solution was more centralization and as far as I understand delegates are committee members, so much work for them. I think we need to facilitate the participation of new users.
Hey, SR from Gamma. I stuck around for Season 2 to monitor OP governance and learn about your experimental process. It’s part of a larger scheme I’m doing to research for our future governance model someday. I must commend everyone on their passion and dedication to Optimism.
I will say that I have one major conclusion from Season 2: The Committee system, while well-intentioned, has been a huge net negative. I will explain my observations briefly below.
1) Committees make the application process confusing for all
I don’t think I need to offer much-supporting evidence here. Almost every project has been confused by the committee system. The deadlines, allocations, and pretty much everything has been unclear. While I respect the idea that “we’ll figure it out,” I think it’s far too confusing for the average applicant. Many of these projects are simultaneously doing a dozen other governance proposals, and forcing them through a complex committee process isn’t efficient.
2) Committees warp the free-market power structure of delegation
One of the cool things about DAOs to me is the free-market aspect of delegation. If I, SR, wanted to become a delegate, I would need to either acquire OP, or convince people to delegate OP to me. If a delegate wishes to have more governance power, they can use any number of strategies to work on that. The best delegates will be the most competitive for the delegated OP. We have delegates that are private holders, DAO enthusiasts, project leads, VCs, and more. That’s kinda how it should be IMO.
Unfortunately, committees create bureaucrats. Or, in layman’s terms, they create gatekeepers with a disproportionate amount of power than they should have. These committee members become lightning rods for controversy and gatekeeping.
3) Committees have brought out the worst in people
Issues #1 and #2 both invariably lead to issue #3, that the committee system has brought out accusations, corruption, innuendo, favoritism, Machiavellianism, brinkmanship, factions, and pretty much everything that poisons the governance process.
This process started during the heated election between the defi committees and never stopped.
It never recovered after that.
Twitter posts attacked the other committee’s recommendations based on thoroughness.
Users went to other discords to denigrate or discredit other delegates, despite their claims
People requested threads be brigaded
Requests were made to censor or ban users from the discord and governance forums.
It also just became childish with amateur attempts to humiliate delegates
Hey, you’re picking on Velodrome!
I know I’m picking on Velodrome and their attacks on @OPUser, but honestly, their actions (and specific reactions to me calling it out) demonstrated the committee system failure the best. That’s what I was trying to show the whole time. @OPUser rejected my original proposal rather harshly. I have no vested interest in any committee member.
I think Velodrome members are just doing what they think they need to do in a hypercompetitive space. They’re very pvp and they embrace that. Do I think it’s ethical? No. But I get what they’re doing.
My recommendation is to abolish the committee system ASAP.
Potential Solution: Recognized Delegates
Recognized Delegates (RDs) are a system where any delegate can go through the “official process” and become legit. RDs are required to vote and to write WHY they voted on proposals. They are then paid based on their participation rates and the # of delegates they have. This incentivizes delegates to write up their feelings on issues and spend some time going through the proposals. Delegates can also get bonuses for assisting users’ questions.
This is the system MakerDAO uses, and while not perfect, the RD system itself works pretty well. I think it’s an excellent alternative to the committee system. Every delegate has a shot to get paid for doing the work.
Thanks btw, everyone. It’s been a very fascinating experiment, and I thank everyone (even the velo guys) for the political intrigue.
I’m glad that @katie and @forrest are teeing up a major unaddressed elephant in the room - the poor outcomes of the distribution process to date. A lot of the structural concerns in my view are related to this core symptom. I’ve been writing a much longer piece of research on this point [edit: nvm this got really long], but I do want to say that I’m largely in line with their conclusions, which include more selectivity on grants, more time to deliberate, more reporting, staging, and general accountability, etc. Some sort of budgeting (which should start to seek inflows of capacity, to the extent it’s possible) is more than appropriate as well.
I do want to note – because I think some of these postmortems are obliquely referring to a large grant proposal currently on the table, Velodrome’s (i.e., my protocol’s)—that the wrong thing to do is to have a knee-jerk response to large grants (assuming they’re well-scoped) and say, “Well, we need to close the purse.” Doing that just kills whatever momentum you’ve just spent too much to get. You can say I’m speaking out of bias, but hear me out here—I’m trying to make what I think is an important point that I happen to be really attuned to bc of my experience.
Where I disagree with @forrest is that it’s not that Governance has given out too much—it’s that we’ve given an enormous amount to a lot of not-fully-baked grants while lacking an ecosystem-wide thesis on what to grow and when to grow it. If I had to make a totally non-data-backed guess, my hypothesis is that proposals representing 70-80% of the OP shouldn’t have been granted at all, not just scaled back. (I’ll be testing this hypothesis soon with a more detailed analysis.) Reporting would have helped with some of this, but primarily it’s for averting or surfacing malfeasance. Staging helps to redirect some OP to more promising ends and lends some teeth to enforcement, but the vast majority, i’m guessing, just never should have been granted in the first place.
It’s actually a bit surprising to me that nobody here has explicitly said, “Maybe in hindsight, many of these grants we approved actually weren’t that well defined.” Delegates who were more prominent figures during the first few cycles should take a hard look at their earlier recommendations and walk back through the logic in approving what they did. I know I’ll plan to do the same for the later cycles. There are already a couple I think I botched. This is underappreciated reflection for this period.
I’m giving this tough love because the saddest part about this mass distribution’s outcomes (and, to be clear, the vast majority came before committees) was that they were entirely avoidable.
People who’ve been around for a while, for instance, know how some of these things end: retroactive airdrops (exit events), user incentives (sibyl risk, low per-wallet appeal), liquidity mining on low-DAU projects (siphoning by team or last-ditch effort to grow runway)—stuff I’ve been calling out from my very first day in the forums, and I’m sure I wasn’t alone.
What I’m getting at is that there is no ‘right’ cap on all grants: you need to match the asks to an intended outcome—a well-defined bet that you and the proposer intend to see play out. You can and should add jet fuel with some big bets, just like OP Labs did to great effect with PoolTogether (beloved user hoover), Velodrome (flashy tentpole liquidity sink), and AAVE (blue-chip liquidity magnifier). But you don’t take a scattershot approach in grants, giving out a few hundred k here and there; you work with projects to refine their grants until they promise real results. And when you see a path to growth, you fund for precisely that growth.
And this goes back to my first comments re committees, during the start of what several individuals here have marked as a downturn in vibes: there need to be in some capacity specialists whose focus is specifically on these grants. There is just too much to do. These are difficult questions, and there’s a lot to follow up on. These specialists need to outline a systemic growth thesis, they need to follow an actual cooperative due diligence process, and they need some limited executive power to make and enforce rules to speed up an otherwise bogged down process. One such example is reporting; there was a whole thread in June discussing the need for follow-up reporting, and nobody managed to get a framework together.
People reacted violently to my suggesting as much in June because perhaps they interpreted what I was saying as that people without the necessary expertise to take on these roles lacked the aptitude or intelligence or something. Of course that’s not true! What I’ve said is that being charged with giving out millions of OP requires some clear direction, experience, and knowhow; it’s inherently a technocratic thing, and I do think that ecosystem protocol teams have a lot to offer in experience, perspective, and news. Even better, though, are known subject matter experts from throughout crypto, and I’d love to see about getting a few more involved (we’re lucky to have several as delegates and more than a few on committees).
To be clear, I’m not talking about committees now, nor am I saying I or anyone in particular fits this profile! No idea what structure we will/should take, and yeah I agree that the system we have isn’t the best fit (agree with @StrategicReserve’s suggestion to look to RDs and look forward to getting thoughts from @katie and @GFXlabs on applicability) — but I think this is a principle worth seriously considering.
We’re all here because we believe in the potential of the Collective to be a self-sustaining community, one that can recycle this first round of grants and ensuing economic activity into new capacity to do ever more interesting things. Realizing this vision is a lot more likely when we knock out some low-hanging fruit early in our processes, avoid pressure to over-distribute, and—most importantly—be informed and active.
Want to echo this. Nowhere else in the world (or even DeFi) are millions of dollars handed out on the backs of volunteer labor. There is a saying out in the regulatory landscape when people have had a drink and want to dunk on DeFi – that DAOs are the greatest breakthrough in labor relations since the cat-o-nine-tails. That’s not what we want here. The goal is inclusion, yes, but not uncompensated responsibilities that are difficult to bear for delegates who don’t receive compensation outside of Optimism, yet carry possible liability and reputational risk from being tasked with saying “No” to unwise spending proposals.
Delegates have put in a great effort, but when this role competes with families, jobs, hobbies, and life in general, it’s difficult to expect better results than were presented in the sobering call this week. That the single grant to Aave has surpassed ALL grants from this governance in effectiveness by orders of magnitude says a lot. The modest and very specific justification for proposals that typically fall before the Tooling Committee vs most others (with meme requests like 420k) also serves as an anecdotal alarm that things are not well in the grant program.
Given the large sums at risk, professionalization seems imperative – and that only comes with compensation. Even just reducing the amount of waste would more than pay for a couple dozen delegates to put in 8-10 hours a week. Paying for 3-4 days a month of delegate time seems prudent here.
We are confident, however, that Optimism can overcome these challenges. We don’t necessarily agree that committees should be disbanded, but perhaps exploring other power structures could be useful. Perhaps the committees decide what comes up for a vote. Or perhaps they only have veto power to block a proposal. Or perhaps they continue in merely an advisory role. Or perhaps they have an optimistic role where their recommendations stand unless X votes choose to send the choice to a full vote as we do today. There are many options beyond disbandment – committees have been a net positive for governance, even if serving on one is onerous and unpleasant.
Rather than jump to a conclusion or prescription now, perhaps this upcoming Reflection Period would be a good time to understand which delegates are active, get in-depth feedback beyond a forum reply, and make some changes. Many of us (at least on DeFi Committee A) are professional governance service providers. These are not new problems. Some have defied solutions on other protocols (so let’s avoid those same attempts here) while others have yielded to trial and error (so let’s learn from that here). Please utilize the experiences that seasoned individuals and entities bring to the table. Coupled with the energy of Optimism-native enthusiasts, governance iteration can be faster, fairer, and more productive.
Good to see the camping meme jump over to Op forums
Regarding delegate compensation: we have extremely low participation from token holders too. Engagement for the last cycle was dangerously low with some proposals passing with <5% circulating tokens voting For. So, I’d like to see appropriate rewards for both a) active delegates and b) token holders that vote for active delegates (active can be defined as simple as voting for >X% governance proposals). I’d assume one of the future airdrops will target this - but I hope to see an initiative to drive more participation immediately/asap.
I understand committees are not the perfect solution, but unfortunately we don’t have a better one right now. Losing committees would make delegate participation even worse - I certainly don’t have the bandwidth to consider all of those proposals. From the perspective of a delegate, we need something like this - at least for the Gov Fund proposals.
Thanks for your feedback.
I like the idea. Should delegates or users gain some particular “expert badges” in some field they’re specialized in?
- Proposal Recommendation
- I totally understand frustration from a project side on getting No as a recommendation but wrapping a proposal recommendation as a possible attack on the Protocol and using that to down play other committee is not sustainable. This might push some community member away.
- When reviewing a proposal I am looking at the template provided to us by OP Foundation, it has different statement; when a protocol is unique I do give it few extra points but overall what is mentioned in the proposal has more value, for me its an non-binding agreement. I am not suggesting your protocol is not good or it does not have value, my suggestion is to improve few things, I am asking for additional information, this gonna only make proposal better, making a small change could make the overall process better. But there two instances where a “No” recommendation blew out of proportion.
I would like to echo concern related to overall lack of engagement as others have mentioned above.
Fund accountability and lack of communication from prior grant receiver
Apart from Uni, Rubicon, Pooltogether no one is sharing any detail related to use of fund and its impact on the ecosystem. I dont expect OP Foundation to poke every protocol but may be from community side we can put some pressure on them, we have many delegate with huge online presence. All we need is little push. To my surprise when I contacted Slingshot for details on Phase 0 fund usage they were kind enough to provide a detailed report (Its not dune but its something)while Stargate didnt even responded to direct DM or twit. We did approve those fund, this is the least we could do.
I dont believe we are spending too much or too fast, I think we are doing the distribution in dark without proper data. Phase 0 was inauguration ceremony, we did bulk approval. At that, There were 7 proposal I would have voted against and now when I look back and read those proposal, this number has moved to 13 (which also show that we have made progress in auditing proposal). So, using old metric to evaluate a proposal might hurt us in long run.
I would like to iterate again, and last community call should be wake up call for all of us, we need data on overall fund use. Here, I dont trust any project as they could possibly inflate the number, I am advocating that this report should either come from Foundation or from an independent third party.
Usually protocol as responsive to feedback and willing to adjust the token requested but one think I am reading frequently is that “we believe X amount of $OP is justifiable because a similar project in Phase 0 was approved” or in other word, when foundation can approve a similar grant why you are asking to reduce it. ? I can answer to this question if we have data.
Looking at upcoming go-live date of other L2s, we need to be more competitive and this could help us that.
What we are hearing now is the echo of our bulk approvals,I wouldn’t call it a mistake, but I am afraid, it will be if we go one more season without accountability of fund. (Here I am talking about both grant, Gov + Foundation)
- Lack of context
This is quite important, at least to me, protocols are comparing their proposal from past proposal, like mentioned above, without knowing the context.
We are doing all this in an iteration, rushing to make chance mid-cycle makes no sense at all. New community members are not aware of this and we should help them understand the process but in this season I saw that existing community member were rushing to make changes mid-cycle.
Some delegates are engaged with other task and does not have enough bandwidth to read everything, that was one reason to form the committee, and if you spam the complete channel on daily basis then either it will create an illusion that what you are advocating for is a common opinion hence creating a echo-chamber and delegates will end of making an un-informed decision.
- Community Management
- We need some rules related to community management, there should be a process to ban/deactivate someone’s account for a time period( on some criteria).
- Community code of conduct is needed.
- I would like to see a process to relieve a delegate from its duties, my suggestion would be to this when Citizen house is active as i would like to see them involved when someone invoke delegate removal process.
Those are my personal opinion, as a committee we will also share a committee feedback summary.
I would avoid any kind of subjective assessment from OP labs or other delegates that can be used to determine what someone is or is not good at.
RDs are pretty simple. You have your “story”. You fill out a questionnaire about your background and skills. On maker, they actually make you deploy a contract too.
Once you’re an RD. You are judged by three factors:
- participation percentage
- response percentage
- OP you hold
These get put into the algo (it’s progressive, so whales get paid less per OP) and you are paid for your contributions. If you miss a vote, your participation percentage goes down. If you miss a response, your response percentage goes down. If people undelegate, your voting weight goes down. All these things will determine how much you are paid.
RDs avoid gaming the system by internal policing. Responses are not screened for being fair or balanced etc, they are simply screened for being cohesive and understandable, If someone is just copy pasting a canned response, that can be evaluated by the OP labs foundation.
It would be wise for OPLabs foundation to create a sort of “Ombudsman” type role, that validated users’ responses as adequate and kept the delegates in check to their status.
There has been some concern expressed by delegate that they don’t have the time/bandwith/allocations to do this work. But I would strongly discourage tolerating that behavior. In a delegate free market, if you don’t vote and participate, you should generally lose delegation, and you certainly shouldn’t be paid. Paying RDs gives smaller delegates a chance to snatch OP from bigger ones by being more thorough.
I appreciate people are busy so I will write short:
- Slow the heck down. We are spending too much money, too fast. This is too much work for the committees.
- As a commitee member I have to say that yes it’s unpleasant to be in one. And if we use the “oh but you are compensated” for this excuse fuck that … I don’t need it. Committee members gets blamed for everything. Slow responses, proposal rejections, not enough feedback, not being online enough etc.
- Taking the compensation further, I don’t think committees and delegate should be much different. Delegates should also be compensated as they are doing a lot of work too. Reading a commitee’s recommendation and agreeing or not, while comparing to the original proposal is not trivial. Now multiply that by 20 proposals and you got a full time job.
- I personally found commitees helpful. Annoying to be in one, but for the proposals that were not for the tooling committee I almost always went with the recommendation. And it felt good.
Thanks for the explanation. I’ll follow the RD program on MAKER. I’m also reading about the MAKER endgame proposal. It may be a positive step for OP, but I have a feeling that in the long term something else is needed. There is a missing peace that we need to find through experimentation.
Firstly, I have read some of your post and it’s great to see a few people on OP caring about the values and expressing their points of view with honesty and humbleness.
I’m glad you point out the low token holders participation. This is a critical point for me. I believe we need to spread the word about the importance of the OP collective governance experiment. This is not only DeFi (that’s why I keep talking about the bias) this is about an oportunity to change the world in a lot of ways.
I’ve been spreading the work on some Spanish forums and I brought a few people to the protocol by sending them some ETH to claim the NFT, and I helped a friend to claim his airdrop and delegate before the snatpshot. It’s not easy, but I’ll keep trying to find a way for community engagement. This is the personal relationship approach I believe in, but is so much time-consuming and hard to compete with mass media marketing and trends.
I love this proactive behavior and what you say about data is essential. Nice job
@GFXlabs @Bobbay_StableLab and @fig are all recognized delegates with Maker (also members of DeFi committee A) and I have been with Maker since 2018 so we have some experience with this. The recognized delegate system is similar to what I was envisioning for OP delegates. We already have delegate profiles, I think the only missing piece would be to apply performance metrics for compensation that could include voting frequency, communication and amount delegated. I’m looking forward to hearing more ideas and feedback on this topic during the reflection period!
From a free-market perspective, DAOs and OP Token House should follow free-for-all mechanisms. I deeply believe decision making should be achieved by consensus and not because people put trust in few members/delegates. We all know achieving consensus is hard but it’s how DAOs make any sense at all. We don’t need DAOs to replace hierarchical organizations.
That said, I’m happy if we end the committees experiment in this season and we reward/incentive participation using objective and subjective metrics.
This is what I would like to see in the future (next season)…
Free-for-All Governance Paradigm
- No hierarchical power, delegates and non-delegates have the same status, power and voice.
- Proposals should incorporate a “temperature check” poll to move to the next phase (voting phase or something else before that).
- Token House Members will receive “Points” for every measurable action (objective metrics).
- Points are converted at the end of each season into a payment and/or NFT (using a subjective ratio voted at the end of the season). This payment can be claimed (following previous rules, KYC for money/OP, …) or reverted to the DAO if not claimed.
I guess this season revealed the less layers we have in the Governance Process better it is for everyone. We can keep Voting phases on a regular base but we need to simplify this process. Using “temperature checks” and a fixed N amount of votes (25, 50, 100 I don’t really know but it can’t be a low number) to move proposals to the last phase (voting) can work.
Even if the proposal doesn’t look ready (ideally only members with “some activity” should be able to vote to avoid fake accounts), even if there’s not enough iteration/feedback, at the end voters will make their choice. If there’s enough feedback and even some analysis of pros and cons (whatever) better it is for the proposal. In the free-for-all logic, members willing to help the governance process should create their own analysis/review post on Proposals they want to focus. Considering engagement of that post they will receive points (that will be converted in some sort of payment at end of season). There’s some competition aspect in this, if N members (delegates or not) create their own analysis of the same proposal the ones with more likes will receive more points. Difference in this competition is people isn’t competing against each other but competing to make their reviews more useful to everyone in the Governance. Btw, this also requires a new forum structure with sub-categories for every cycle to make everything cleaner.
I like to use hybrid versions of this objective metrics, for instance instead of 1 reply/comment = 1 point, I like to think replies without a single like aren’t useful at all (meaning they will get zero points). I will just share some metrics as example and we can go from there (if people like the concept).
Proposal comments/replies: Every 5 likes gives 1 point => likes / 5
- 1 comment with 5 likes = 1 point;
- 2 Likes + 2 Likes + 1 like in different comments = 0.4 + 0.4 + 0.2 = 1 point;
- btw, 5 can be replaced with any value. I think 5 is fine since we don’t have much engagement but we can even change this value for each season.
Review Posts/Topics: Using all likes on the post and comments seems fair, avoiding using the same exact ratio let’s say 7 likes = 1 point => (likes on comments and post) / 7
- Post creator (proposal reviewer) will receive points not based on the amount of replies (to avoid spam) but instead based on the quality measurable by users feedback (likes). Sure this can be gamed but that’s why we still need some subjective metrics at the end to filter/remove/ignore “attacks”.
- I don’t follow discord at all but similar rules can be applied and tracked on discord. Also, since I don’t have a clue if people will like to follow something like this I will stop here (for now). Nonetheless there’s plenty of metrics we can use to give points to DAO members.
This reply is longer than what I would like so I will end with this note: Subjective metrics should allow us the fight spam, unfairness in some objective metrics and more.
Small Update → This subjective metrics can range from ratios to convert points into OP/Whatever to something like ignoring/voiding points from some posters (fake accounts), topics, whatever. From my perspective, subjectivity is always needed to prevent abuse/attacks (it’s not to replace objective metrics but instead to improve their effectiveness).
First season it was Leftrissjp with Infinity wallet proposal, then we saw it happening with Katie’s committee, shortly after that honor was mine and now I see the torch has passed to Poylnya.
Some of us were motivated to join this Gov because of its alignment towards public good, for others supporting a fully EVM compatible L2 is like supporting Ethereum and we want to see both succeed, lastly I think few were dragged towards Optimism Governance because of our two pillar governance model.
Feedback is quite important for any discussion, gov or in general, DAO or distributed co-ordination is chaotic and difficult. But we should not break the barrier between engagement and harassment. Some of the delegates has many thing on their plate and still they choose to be part of us, part of this governance and we should be grateful for their time and effort.
So think, is it worth pushing them away just because they dont agree with your opinion. Thoughts ?