A Tarot DAO governance proposal has been introduced, which seeks to add protocol-held TAROT liquidity to Velodrome on Optimism and incentivize veVELO holders to vote for emissions to these TAROT-based pools:
Since the introduction of this proposal in July, the following updates have been incorporated in response to community feedback:
Matching TAROT Co-Incentives: A Tarot DAO governance proposal, TIP-018: Tarot Co-Incentivization on Optimism, was adopted to allocate 3,000,000 TAROT over a 12-month period towards Optimism incentives.
Expanded Distribution: The distribution of OP token incentives for liquidity providers was expanded to include all TAROT-based pairs, over a longer period (12-16 months).
Initial OP-TAROT Liquidity: A portion of the OP incentives (60,000 OP) will be paired with team-held TAROT and provided as initial liquidity on Optimism for a period of at least 12 months.
Optimism Metrics: Usage metrics have been expanded to include transaction counts for Tarot’s router and vault contracts on Optimism.
Updated V2 Template: The proposal has been updated to conform with the updated V2 proposal template. Further details provided include: distribution milestones, an explanation for how Tarot will incentivize usage and liquidity on Optimism, and how the development of future products and yield opportunities on Optimism will continue after incentives have concluded.
Nobody has to use Tarot for levered farming. People also can just single-sided lend their tokens to any of the pools and will earn a return on that, with zero IL. Using Tarot that way is less risky than even providing liquidity to DEXs like Uniswap or Sushi.
There’s other use cases as well(auto-compounder like Beefy, for example, with near-zero fees). Nobody has to use the leverage part, and it still would be a big plus to the Optimism ecosystem.
And what if i told you tarot is also an auto-compounder ?
I’m a bit confused of such comment as it’s very pretentious to think about risk management on behalf of others, and neglecting leverage farming on Defi is a simple non sense and shows a clear lack of understanding on the basics of Finance.
Rationale: All of tokens are being used to bootstrap Tarot’s own token; the use of the tokens being distributed to the core team for operational costs is unclear in terms of breakdown of resources, and there is a long distribution period.
Next Steps: Our recommendation is to focus on Optimism pairs and add transparency around the use of funds for operational costs.
Hello Op Gov Watch, we have clarified our position here and here and we standby our decision as a committee. However, delegates are free to vote on any proposal as they wish. As a committee, we will not be approving every proposal that comes our way which is in no way a “snub” to the project itself or the people involved. Additionally, any project is free to submit the proposal again in future voting cycles.
We think this proposal is promising as a catalyst for substantial growth in use and economic multipliers for neighboring protocols, and we believe the emphasis on providing LP support for TAROT is a clever, cost-efficient means of incentivizing non-LP yield generation and potentially introducing new connections to other financial activities.
We believe that @katie and DeFi committee A rejecting this proposal because it deals with a native token is missing the forest for the trees. It is also puzzling that the same committee supported without reservation Kromatika’s own proposal, which does the same thing—uses both protocol-owned-liquidity and liquidity incentivization of its native token $KROM—with less justification. We will publish our own review of this other proposal shortly.
Would still like to see a breakdown of Tarot’s intended dev activities, though, and we agree that the term of the distribution is far too long.
The risk of this feeling like a snub doesn’t come from the committee’s rejection of the proposal. That is your committee’s right. It is that the committee’s rejection seems to be born a misunderstanding of the nature of Tarot and the role that LP incentives will play in driving protocol activity, even after it has been clarified by @TigrisOfGaul and @jackanorak.
Statements like “all of tokens are being used to bootstrap Tarot’s own token” doesn’t acknowledge that doing so is a more capital efficient way to incentivize Tarot usage then direct protocol incentives and “our recommendation is to focus on Optimism pairs” seems like you’ve entirely missed the point of the incentives. Why would a lending and borrowing protocol looking to grow on Optimism ask for a grant to incentivize OP pairs?
If this is where you all choose leave things, I see two risks:
Tarot doesn’t have specific and actionable feedback to submit an improved proposal, maybe doesn’t even try
Builders develop a perception that they can’t trust governance to understand or engage with nuanced proposals resulting worse outcomes for the ecosystem
If the committee is going to stick to it’s no recommendation, I would like to see them at the very least demonstrate they understood and remain unpersuaded by the thoughtful clarifications offered below.
Tarot, an incentivized leveraged yield protocol, is unlike many projects in that it can (and would) directly incentivize general use selectively with token emissions. Borrow and lend on the protocol, get TAROT in addition to your compounded yield.
Because of this, using OP to incentivize liquidity on TAROT is more or less tantamount to directly incentivizing borrowing and lending activity. More liquidity → more capacity to issue TAROT → more users of the protocol.
In this way, Tarot would have the flexibility to juice certain types of activity it wants to promote without having to redirect OP to farmers looking to dump it. Pairing TAROT with OP isn’t necessary but does offer a marginal liquidity backstop for OP.
We view the OP incentives program through the lens of efficient capital allocation , and structured our proposal to align the long-term success of Tarot on Optimism with that of the Optimism network.
Currently, the direct incentivization of DEX liquidity is 30-50x more capital efficient than incentivizing borrow activity in Tarot. For example, $1 of OP bribes results in $2-3 of DEX rewards almost immediately, compared to $1 of OP borrow incentives resulting in ~$1 of borrow activity over one year. From the protocol’s point-of-view, it makes no sense to bribe non-TAROT pairs on DEXs, as the impact of bribing other pairs does not flow to Tarot directly.