Sorry, I donât have any strong feelings, and Iâm a novice to this governance stuff. I apologize for the wording. In future, itâd be best of the projects declare if theyâll use the granted OP for governance voting, and if so, why.
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Here it depends on the flexibility of each one, letâs imagine that all projects do the same and use the inactive tokens from the OP for different activities as long as they donât âviolate the original proposalâ, it would be very difficult to follow and verify that each one complies with its original proposal. I think this would blur the main goal of governance and open the door to constant cheating.
Protocols can always reapply for another application, and they can also propose a tokenization change through governance, I donât see any problem here. If they want to change they can propose it and bring it to a vote. If they want more OP tokens they can reapply for the next phase
Proposals are on the forum for at least 2 weeks, sometimes even longer, no great activity is required.
It is also part of the commitment made by the delegates when they applied to the forum. See here.
So I donât see whatâs wrong with a delegate fulfilling the commitment they made, just like other delegates who donât, we canât force them to spend time on governance.
I think itâs clear, protocols have to be clear what the OP tokens are going to be used for, thatâs what the application template is for.
The final decision is always in the snapshot.
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Protocols can always reapply for another application, and they can also propose a tokenization change through governance, I donât see any problem here. If they want to change they can propose it and bring it to a vote. If they want more OP tokens they can reapply for the next phase
Are you implying that any change to a projectâs distribution plan should be voted on through OP governance even after a project has received their allocation?
I donât think thatâs feasible to police and nor should it be pursued, the best way to assess a projectâs distribution plan is upon future gov fund applications. When a project applies for a second allocation, the entirety of their OP distribution and itâs impact can be assessed at that time. Delegates would have a clear picture of how a protocol contributed to Optimismâs growth and improvement and make a decision accordingly.
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I donât think I expressed myself well.
What I meant in general terms is that protocols can always fall back on governance. I think whether it is for a change or to request more OP tokens, governance in my opinion has to be a useful tool for all participants.
Even if a protocol decides to make a change in the token utilization plan, I think it would be correct or more transparent to communicate it through governance. I think this way this kind of debates and controversies could be avoided in the future.
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This is a very interesting question. I am actually not sure what the right answer should be here. Perhaps we should make it standard to specify in a governance funding proposal what they intend to do with the idle funds while they are not being spent/allocated.
I may be on the minority here but I donât see it as bad to have more people/projects involved in governance, even if that comes from using idle funds from governance funding. Perhaps proposals for funding should be structured and paid out so there is no funds sitting idle but thatâs another topic altogether.
Right now governance power seems quite concentrated. Perhaps allowing this would help to change this?
But since this seems to be a hot topic and already debated a lot here, would it not make sense to make it part of the proposal template? Something like: âDo you intend to use the idle funds for governance?â
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Yes, even after several conversations, among some participants we have made this proposal
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ha i think its a good idea .but dao is the most important decider
support the opinion,its a good idea
That was a really good spot @OPUser, I donât in principle mind if projects want to delegate a small portion of received funds to voting, IF they state in their proposal that this is what they will be doing.
As @lefterisjp says, it might even be a good thing for project teams who have received funding from Optimism to have some say in the governance, not only does it help decentralize power amongst more different people, but they are going to be teams that weâve already assessed as being well aligned with Optimism. On the other hand, I donât think an optimal outcome has grant recipients instantly having a multiple times bigger say than the biggest delegates, who are each representing about 12k users.
While Perp have done the right thing and undelegated now the issue has been brought to light, we do probably need to address the issue in a way that doesnât rely on the honest actions of unknown individuals. From what I understand there is no way to blacklist addresses from SnapShot votes, therefore a harmful governance attack from other recipients in the future seems like a very real possibility if we donât come up with a solution.
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Yeah Iâm on the same page and agree with the reasoning, I donât think itâs necessarily a bad thing that we have protocol participation in token house.
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I fully agree.
For some context: the Velodrome team has done a review of every single proposal for funding submitted up to this point.
(Shoutout primarily to @jackanorak)
We are deeply engaged in Optimismâs growth, we are an Optimism native protocol, and have been trusted to a large degree by OP Labs to help fulfill the promise of more users and more liquidity.
It would seem to me (and yes, I am deeply biased) that we are exactly the sort of people that Optimism would WANT to participate in Governance. We happen to have ~3m OP tokens, tokens that were granted to us separate from any governance process. But because of community discomfort about protocolâs self-delegating - in any amount - we have zero stake in governance voting & decision making.
To me, this is a missed opportunity. Are there risks here? Yes, teams could act maliciously, teams could self-serve. But these are risks regardless of self-delegation.
Our alternative option is to aggressively campaign for people to shift their delegation to us.
Iâm all for including $OP delegation plans in funding proposals, Iâm all for implementing a process. But I canât help but feel like what we witnessed in this thread is a small number of people gate-keeping what is meant to be a decentralized governance process, with no clear positive outcome.
IMO having PERP as partners in governance would have strengthened the Optimism Collective. We lost those voices and votes, and missed an opportunity to have protocol level involvement in governance decisions in the process.
What have we gained?
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Iâll take this a step further:
Whatâs preventing the Perp team from capturing a majority of its own granted tokens through liquidity mining and then self-delegating individually? Essentially the same outcome would occur, the Perp team having the same voting influence it wanted, but now weâll never know whoâs behind their votepower, and weâd lack a delegate with a voice in the forums.
Now consider all the liquidity mining that teams have proposed to date (Iâm soon going to propose an updated state of grants), and now there is a huge leak in transparency relative to protocol-owned votepower.
Iâd argue that retroactively allowing teams to self-delegate is a vote for transparency in addition to what I hope is a broadly shared belief that projects have a unique perspective to share to the collective and are legitimate stakeholders in this community. Perhaps we simply ask that they create delegate profiles to reflect their intentions.
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No one is saying or even suggesting that a project should not have a say in gov. Gov is open and any can and should participate.
We already have many delegates from different project, even Perp has a delegate representation.
If you or anyone wants to be part of the delegate, they should follow the same approach as others. Create a delegate profile and participate just like others.
I dont see a problem in asking users to delegate their votes to you.
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Interesting.
So thereâs a possibility a massive amount of $OP liquidity mining rewards are going to team/initial investor/team controlled entities/VC wallets???
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Yeah, without question â the analysis of Perpâs own liq mining is one such example. In many cases, VCâs value add is âweâll provide liquidity on your pool,â and so on.
Itâs not inherently a bad thing, and often itâs not preventable, as when a teamâs currently supporting the protocol and owns many of the tokens, and the hope is that the incentives will make this less the case.
But this is why you want to see growth in wallets LPing in the course of these incentives, to show youâre not just paying a ton of OP to the 10 DAUs of some project and the dev team over many many months or letting them self-delegate and accrue OP votepower for the next round of incentives.
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As Iâve said in past points - getting users to change delegation is an uphill battle following the initial airdrop / delegation flood.
- It requires users to click buttons + spend gas. Always a bad thing
- I imagine we will not see any significant shift in delegates until another airdrop that requires delegation. If the delegates are the same as last time, we will simply se a further centralization of delegate power.
I know that no one is saying or suggesting that a project should not have a say in governance, governance is open and any one CAN and SHOULD participate - just not with the tokens they currently have. A big âjust notâ.
just not with the tokens they currently have
Well it depends how they got the token.
It requires users to click buttons + spend gas. Always a bad thing
I imagine we will not see any significant shift in delegates until another airdrop that requires delegation. If the delegates are the same as last time, we will simply se a further centralization of delegate power.
I am glad you mentioned this as there is a proposal in current voting cycle focusing on fixing this. Also, there has been lot of discussion around solving voters apathy so i expect some changes in season 2 around that too.
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One thing I love about you, @OPUser, is your dedication to the governance process. While we may have disagreed at several times I respect that you continually show up in this forum and try to push forward Optimismâs Governance Process.
Iâd like to be able to do the same, currently I have 30k OP delegated. Velodrome will gain voting power, and weâll do so without ruffling feathers.
I do think any future grant should:
Allow some % of Protocol Granted OP to be self-delegated to ensure Protocol participation in governance, say 25%
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Hey @gabagool, thank you.
And indeed, we have disagreement on couple of topic but I see that as a positive things as it leads to discussion and open engagement. As long as we are fighting towards a common goal and not with each other, gov will win.
Believe me, like you, I want more delegate and users participation in our gov process but instead of locking 25%, how about this ?
from total voting power available, project can request for max X% of voting power as self-delegate. This percentage can be decided with a proposal. Keeping in mind that, it should not be permanent.
Problem with 25% is that its quite relative, a project asking for 1M OP token and self-delegating 25% will put them in top 10 while another project asking for 300K will put them into top 80-90 range.
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Delegation is never permanent, particularly as these tokens are all being distributed. Over time, they will be re-delegated depending on who holds the particular token
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25% was an example, I think it makes sense to have a cap X% of granted OP.
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As more and more OP tokens are distributed, we should not use âcurrent delegates %â as a metric, as those delegates received their voting shares when OP circulating supply was much smaller.