Guidance on Representative Structure Mandates

The Evolution of Representative Structures in Season 7

All representative structures in the Collective should work to achieve our Season 7 Intent.

In determining Season 7 mandates, the Foundation will transition more autonomy to Prospective Leads. There are a few required stipulations, but otherwise the Foundation will transition to an advisory role in the creation of Charters.

The Foundation has waited to share new information about the evolution of representative structures until November 26th in order to:

  • facilitate more focus on last Season’s performance (retrospectives) before focusing on how representative structures should evolve for the next Season
  • reduce the advantage for incumbents. New entry and competition are critical parts of a healthy governance system and it’s important to have competitive proposals for representative structures, such as the alternative Season 6 DAB renewal proposals for example. To better facilitate this, the Foundation has created generalized Charter, Budget, and Internal Operating Procedures.

Timeline for Prospective Leads

  • November 26th: Budget Proposal Workshop
    • Dane Lund, the previous Grants Council Lead, will facilitate a workshop on Budget Proposal creation on November 26th at 4PM GMT, which will not be recorded.
  • November 26th to December 4th: All prospective Leads can draft and post Operating Budgets for Season 7.
    • Drafts are due on December 4th at 19:00 GMT.
  • December 5th - December 11th: Reserved for community feedback, discussion, and incorporation before these budgets move to a vote. The Collective Feedback Commission will play an active role in providing guidance and feedback and facilitating broader community conversations about Operating Budgets.
    • All Operating Budgets require 4 Top 100 delegate approvals, which are due by December 11th at 19:00 GMT
  • December 12th - December 18th: Operating Budgets will be voted on by the Token House
  • December 19th: Members can nominate themselves for any Council, Budget, or Board using the process outlined here (Coming soon!)
    • Nominations must be posted on the forum by January 3rd at 19:00 GMT
    • Security Council candidates need 8 Top 100 delegate approvals by January 7th at 19:00 GMT
  • January 8th: Elections!
  • January 26th: Internal Operating Procedures
    • All Councils, Commissions, and Board Leads are responsible for publishing Internal Operating Procedures within 10 days of the start of Season 7.

Foundation Guidance

Below is the Foundation’s guidance on the evolution of each structure. Unless marked as “required,” these are suggestions which may be incorporated at the Prospective Lead’s discretion. The Collective Feedback Commission and the Foundation are available to provide feedback on early drafts (please tag @maxwell to facilitate feedback.)

What’s a legislative role versus an executive function?

Legislative roles develop policy on behalf of the Collective (for example, the policy by which grants are distributed from the Governance Fund.) Legislative roles are elected as legislation is created on behalf of tokenholders.

See the Decision Diagram for more context.

What’s a civil servant?

A civil servant is a non-elected role that completes executive functions that benefit the Collective. Civil servants complete important actions for the Collective and are meant to be non-political.

See the Decision Diagram for more context.

Grants Council: Selection (Module I) / Legislative Structure

  • Members of the Grants Council are elected to fulfill legislative duties. Specifically, the Grants Council selects which contributors will complete work supported by the Governance Fund.
  • The scope of the Grants Council will no longer be restricted to OP Mainnet. The Grants Council may make grants to applicants deploying across the Superchain, so long as the grants work towards the success metrics.
  • The Grants Council is required to make grants that drive the ****success metrics outlined in the Grants Council Mission but may follow whatever grants process it would like to do so. That means the Grants Council may use the existing Mission framework, or choose to use a different framework. It is at the discretion of the Grants Council to continue the Superchain grants program, or not. Selection criteria must be published on the forum before any grants are made (public rubrics, etc.)
    • The Grants Council will be asked to reserve 500k OP to evaluate grants for a pre-approved list of applicants as part of the Decision Market experiment.
  • The Grants Council may consider requiring the Token House to approve any grant over 1.5M OP and/or any grant proposed by a member of the Grants Council.
  • It is required that the Grants Council make grants in accordance with the Collective Grant Policies and any other compliance requirements.

Milestones and Metrics Council: Module H / Executive Structure

  • It is required that that the Milestone and Metrics function become its own Council for four important reasons:
    • The Milestones and Metrics function falls within the category of one of the most important functions in the collective: measuring impact. Measurement is an executive function, which means members on the Milestones and Metrics council should be fulfilled by civil servants, rather than elected representatives. While we need to develop more robust infrastructure in order to identify the most qualified civil servants to fulfill these functions, in the future this structure should transition to a non-elected model. In contrast, the Grants Council fulfills a legislative function, which should continue to be elected.
    • Milestones and Metrics Members perform a fundamentally different role than Grants Council Reviewers. While the Grants Council Reviewers select applicants, the Milestone and Metrics committee evaluates and measures impact. This requires different skills, operations, and tooling.
    • In Season 7, the Milestones and Metrics Council will manage a community multisig, delivering grants to recipients selected by the Grants Council. Separating the Milestones and Metrics committee out as its own structure, enables more efficient multisig management. The Foundation recommends adding 1+ members to the Milestones and Metrics Council to support the additional workload of delivering grants.
    • The Grants Council is currently too large, violating our Design Principle that effective teams are < 14 people. Separating Milestones and Metrics into its own Council, will allow both Councils to operate more effectively.
  • The Foundation will work closely with the Milestones and Metrics Council to develop a robust output measurement system, which further automates the milestones tracking process.

Security Council: Modules M-O / Executive Structure

  • Members of the Security Council are elected to fulfill executive functions. In the future, we believe executive structures should not be elected as execution functions should be executed by non-political civil servants. However, we need to develop more robust infrastructure in order to identify the most qualified civil servants to fulfill these functions.
  • Elections for Cohort B will run alongside all other elections in Season 7. Details to follow.
  • The mandate of the Security Council is not meant to change in relation to a Season’s Intents as the mandate of the Security Council is primarily determined by our level of technical decentralization.
  • The Security Council executes mission critical work, which we don’t believe should rely on Retro Funding while the program is still in the early stages of development. Therefore, the Security Council may request an operating budget from the Governance Fund in Season 7 as the Foundation will no longer provide stipends to members.

Code of Conduct Council: No Module / Institutional Structure

  • The Code of Conduct Council serves as an institutional structure which defines ethics and expectations.
  • Members of the Code of Conduct Council are elected. While having an enforceable Code of Conduct is important, the Foundation believes having it enforced by an elected Council presents unnecessary and undesirable conflicts of interest.
  • The Code of Conduct Council has played a valuable role in our experimentation to enforce the Code of Conduct in a decentralized and governance minimized way. All contributors to the Code of Conduct Council in both Season 5 and Season 6 have made important contributions to the Collective’s iterative and experimental approach to governance.
  • However, the Foundation believes the role played by the Code of Conduct Council should be transitioned to non-politically selected (non-elected) members of a contribution path.
  • Accordingly, the Foundation has put forward a Council Dissolution proposal in Season 7, which will be subject to approval by the Token House.
  • Prospective Leads that believe the CoCC should continue to exist, may still submit an Operating Budget proposal at their discretion.

Developer Advisory Board: Modules I and K / Legislative

  • Members of the Developer Advisory Board are elected to fulfill legislative duties. Specifically, the Developer Advisory Board advises the Grants Council on selecting the contributors that complete work supported by the Governance Fund. The Developer Advisory Board also advises governance participants on Protocol Upgrades.
  • The Developer Advisory Board will be asked to select applicants for Foundation Mission Requests. The Developer Advisory Board will continue to advise the Grants Council as determined by both structures in collaboration.
  • The Developer Advisory Board may also be called on to perform expert evaluation if/when expert, qualitative assessment of impact is required.
  • The Foundation encourages the Developer Advisory Board to play a larger role in Protocol Upgrades, drafting Mission Requests (if and when applicable) and / or helping builders make contributions better aligned with OP Labs’ roadmap.

Anticapture Commission: Governing Policy Module / Institutional Structure

  • The Anticapture Commission serves as an institutional structure that defines ethics and expectations around capture resistance in the Collective.
  • Commission membership is programmatically determined, currently by voting power and participation, but membership selection criteria may benefit from experimentation to identify the best-suited participants.
  • The Foundation originally proposed this program to last for two Seasons, the original time frame thought necessary to onboard the first set of OP Chains. As this onboarding has taken longer than initially expected.
  • The Anticapture Commission may put forward a proposal to continue to receive delegation through the Governance Fund or may continue to operate, as a sort of interest group, via organic delegations only. The process to Amend the Anticapture Commission proposal, so that it may continue to receive delegation, is outlined here.

Collective Feedback Commission: Governing Policy Module / Institutional Structure

  • The Collective Feedback Commission serves as an institutional structure which works with the Foundation to define the process by which governing policies are brought in front of governance. This is similar to the institutional role the Core Development Program plays in defining the process by which protocol upgrades are brought in front of governance.
  • Commission membership is programmatically determined, currently by verifiable metagovernance contributions, but we are actively experimenting with membership selection models.
  • The Collective Feedback Commission has already begun its second iteration, as outlined in this Charter. The Collective Feedback Commission provides services directly to the Foundation and so does not go through a governance process.
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