However, if you look at the proposals that have passed most recently you will see that a 1,000,000 OP is an extremely high ask especially for LP incentives which have often been contentious. I think a lower ask would make it more likely the proposal will receive delegate endorsements and committee approvals.
Yes Tricrypto pool is going to be deployed soon, which I’m sure will quickly be followed by gauge vote, so will be eligible to receive bribes.
Incentives appear as rewards in Votium for voting on a specific gauge. Votium has two services, one pays to CVX and the other to veCRV. They have tens of millions of CVX delegated to them, so would auto optimize votes with CVX. But veCRV there is no delegation, so voters would have to actively vote. OTOH, bribes are more crowded on CVX, so it’s possible you get a better deal going with veCRV. I don’t have a strong preference for one or the other, sounds like maybe Votium’s auto optimizer is more appealing to you?
Hi @OPUser, @MinimalGravitas, @katie: I’m not asking for officially Sponsorship or approval of proposal but I just need verbal delegate support so that my proposal can get proper committee review for cycle-7. Thank you
@Defi_LATAM_axlvaz@SEED_LATAM_Joxes Thank you, I’ve made recipient address available. It’s a gnosis safe composed of long time Cure community members who manage an organization called veFunder, which is a small scale grants org that creates bounties and compensates individuals for their work.
0x3AC79C427F2c6C015E791Cd6ad2578225ed5B6a6 (3/5 Multisig composed of Curve community members: Wormhole, Chanho, Naga, Amadeo, and Knows. Members are all involved with the veFunder Curve bounties program)
So this grant is not actually going to anyone associated with the Curve Team? I’m not sure there is a precedent for this. Why was this only disclosed at the last minute?
Is there a legal entity associated with the group requesting the grant? Are the members willing to KYC?
Hi, Tommy from Votium here. The incentives would appear as voter rewards (commonly referred to as “bribes”). The depositing address would have the choice of rewarding non-Convex veCRV voters, and/or Convex vlCVX voters.
As WormholeOracle mentioned, we are able to optimize vlCVX votes through delegation, but we are unable to do the same for veCRV votes.
Currently we are deployed to mainnet for veCRV and vlCVX, and also on fantom for vlCVX. We haven’t deployed to other networks due to a lack of previous demand.
Thank you to the proposal authors and to the optimism team for your interest. We are on board to deploy on Optimism to help bring volume to Curve<->Optimism!
I hope these concerns are well addressed at the committee review level since 2 delegates have already pushed it up.The reply from Tommy below in my opinion did not address the concerns raised. There should be a good precedence.
I’m changing the proposal back to [DRAFT] and going to update the recipient address. There has been confusion about the distinction between Curve team/community, who is veFunder and are they endorsed by Curve? Curve has tweeted a response to these questions that acknowledges the proposal and endorses veFunder multisig as a good recipient address:
However, we’ve discussed more on the possibility of doing this with a trustless contract, which would alleviate any questions about who the recipient is. A Curve core dev is writing and deploying the contract. To be clear, the requesting party of this grant is Curve, and that won’t be changed.
This method to receive grant funds trustlessly can also be referenced in the future for other teams who have legal concerns around custody of user funds, or who are unable to kyc.