Base, the Superchain, and Governance: Questions That Merit Answers

As an Optimism Collective participant since the early days, I’ve followed the Base partnership since the original 2023 announcements. Base’s inaugural blog post framed the relationship as a foundational, multi-year alignment for the Superchain — not merely a temporary arrangement.

The Base relationship was announced with foundational framing. Base committed to contributing the greater of (a) 2.5% of its total gross sequencing revenue or (b) 15% of its L2 profit after subtracting L1 data submission costs — whichever figure was higher. In exchange, Base would have the opportunity to earn up to approximately 118 million OP tokens over six years. This represented 2.75% of the OP token supply. Base also committed to capping its voting power at no more than 9% of the votable supply.

Base’s January 2024 governance manifesto reaffirmed these commitments, framing them as part of a long-term alignment with Superchain goals. The language throughout emphasized durability: shared governance, public goods funding, and sustained technical collaboration as the second core developer of the OP Stack.

There were no widely disclosed termination rights, exit provisions, notice periods, or revenue-sharing sunset clauses in either post.

Recent developments raise substantial questions about that picture.

On February 18, 2026, Base published a technical announcement describing a full transition to a new unified, Base-operated stack — the base/base repository — moving away from the OP Stack. It is worth acknowledging what that announcement did disclose: Base named the continuing relationship explicitly as OP Enterprise, committed to open-sourcing its stack, pledged to upstream bug fixes and coordinate security disclosures, and stated its intention to maintain Stage 1 decentralization status. That level of transparency is meaningful and should be acknowledged.

What the announcement did not address is the status of the revenue-sharing arrangement.

To understand the stakes: in 2025, Base transferred approximately 3,765 ETH to the Optimism Collective — more than 70% of all Superchain revenue-share contributions that year. Base became the engine of Superchain revenue. The departure of that stream is not a marginal event for the Collective. The issue is structural.

The early framing of the Base relationship created reasonable expectations of durability. Six-year token grants with explicit vesting mechanics, revenue-share formulas, and language explicitly emphasizing long-term Superchain alignment all signal institutional commitment. These were not isolated governance forum disclosures. They were public statements that token holders, developers, and ecosystem participants reasonably relied upon in evaluating the durability of the Superchain’s economic model. When arrangements of that nature change materially — particularly when those changes affect the Collective’s dominant revenue source — governance-relevant questions arise about how these partnerships are structured, disclosed, and modified.

Three questions are most consequential and deserve direct answers.

1. Will any form of revenue sharing from Base continue post-transition? If so, at what level and under what structure? If not, is the original stream effectively concluded? This is the threshold for the Collective. Nearly every downstream planning decision is contingent on the answer.

2. What were Base’s representations regarding durability at the time of the early announcements? I want to be transparent about why I’m asking this directly: the public framing in both the Foundation’s post and Base’s own manifesto was one of long-term alignment with no widely available exit conditions. If the underlying contracts contained modification or termination provisions that permitted this transition, the Collective deserves to understand whether those provisions were considered material to governance disclosures at the time, and why they weren’t surfaced. This isn’t an allegation of bad faith. It is a question about the gap between public framing and contractual reality — a gap the Collective has a legitimate interest in closing, both for its own understanding and to set clearer disclosure standards for future chain partnerships.

3. Is Base still entitled to earn into the remaining unvested portion of the 2.75% OP supply grant? The grant was explicitly contingent on continued participation in the Superchain. Whether transitioning to an independent stack and an “OP Enterprise” client relationship satisfies that condition is not self-evident. The answer has direct implications for token supply and for what “continued participation” will mean as a standard for every chain partnership that follows. This question also has a practical corollary: if the revenue obligation is concluded but the token grant vesting continues, the Collective should understand the basis for that outcome explicitly, not by inference.

Beyond these three, the Collective will also need clarity on how the OP Enterprise arrangement was negotiated and between which legal entities; whether the contractual basis for the 9% voting cap remains intact given the changed relationship; and what a revised Superchain revenue model looks like for Season 9 and beyond.

Base’s engineering rationale for this transition — faster shipping cadences, reduced dependency complexity, an accelerated path to technical decentralization — is coherent and was communicated openly. That context matters and is worth crediting. The concern raised here is not the technical direction. It is whether the economic commitments that accompanied the original partnership remain binding, modified, or concluded — and whether the Collective (including everyone who has invested time, development effort, and capital to the Superchain ecosystem) is receiving that information with the clarity and timing it is owed.

The Superchain’s credibility as a durable alignment framework depends in part on flagship partnerships meaning what they say when they are announced. Getting clear answers here isn’t just about Base. It is about whether future chain partnerships in Web3 can be evaluated with confidence, and whether the Collective’s revenue assumptions are built on firm ground or on commitments whose enforceability was never fully disclosed.

Clear responses from Base and the Foundation are warranted.

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Wanted to add my voice to @danelund.eth’s here that I agree these are reasonable questions that merit answers.

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I’d also like to hear about this, but I’m also very sad how things are going for Optimism. May the Collective be able to listen and innovate to be able to survive!

The original revenue-sharing arrangement was tied to Base’s participation in the Superchain. As part of the transition to a Base-operated stack, the prior Superchain revenue share will not continue.

When Base joined the Superchain in 2023, they emphasized long-term alignment as a reflection of their good faith intent at the time. As we’ve made clear in the past, however, Base’s continued participation in the Superchain was never a given, and like any relationship, the one between Base and the Optimism Collective can change over time. This transition reflects that natural evolution.

Base’s token grant was contingent on continued participation in the Superchain. Therefore, Base is not entitled to the unvested portion of the OP grant it received in 2023.

The 9% voting cap continues to apply to Base.

The agreement for Base to continue its relationship as an OP Enterprise customer was negotiated between the Optimism Foundation and Base, just like the original Superchain revshare agreement. Note that the recently approved buyback program applies to incoming Superchain revenue for 2026, so OP Enterprise revenue will fall outside the scope of the buyback program. This may evolve as part of future restructuring as mentioned in the Season 9 blog post.

For more information on OP Enterprise, see the recent announcement blog post.

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To be clear, this now means Base is paying OP Labs, but Optimism governance – and OP tokenholders – are now receiving zero revenue? This would mean OP Labs now has a material conflict of interest vs OP tokenholders.

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No: OP Enterprise revenues will flow to the Optimism Foundation. These OP Enterprise revenues will not be used as part of the recently approved buyback program, since the program was scoped to Superchain revenue share specifically. However, using OP Enterprise revenues for buybacks will be explored as part of upcoming work around restructuring the Collective’s legal entities mentioned in the Season 9 blog post.

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