I love it … I am about to dive deep into old Roman literature and I find it fascinating.
The ideal situation is to have some sort of veto system or checks and balances in place that keeps any individual or group of delegates from abusing their voting power. Perhaps the token house could also vote in a similar proposal to create consensus among the users of the network with the citizens house in order to remain aligned with the people in order to veto a proposal successfully. That way even the citizens house would have less of a chance on corroborating to make the vote seem more or less one sided.
I’m going to disagree slightly here. I don’t believe it matters how much OP is in circulating supply, if that OP is largely dormant in the voting process (and likely to remain that way), then all that matters in terms of power/control of the governing system is the percentage of delegated (or likely to be delegated) tokens. Also, if those in control currently acted purely in their self-interest, they would use their power to reinforce their own control.
Overall though, I agree that having checks and balances between the two voting houses is a critical next step. I also think there are innovations within token-voting that could promote better community governance (conviction voting, for example).
P.S. I’m a part of governance efforts at University of SoCal. I’d love to talk with yall!
Actually, a very good point and it would be great if this mechanism could be greatly improved with respect to counterbalancing most of the voting powers.
And in any case, it seems to me that if this issue is taken seriously enough, eventually the community and the team will be able to create a more balanced version of governance that is more democratic
noturhandle from Butter here. Happy to see this being discussed.
I agree that participating tokens should be considered the extent of total voting power.
It’s safe to say that some percentage of OP tokens cannot participate in governance, e.g., exchanges and market-makers. Including these tokens in the denominator when calculating proportional governance power hides who’s in control.
Concentrating voting power in the hands of a small number of delegates absolutely threatens to entrench power, but alignment between OP holders is strong, and larger holders & delegates tend to have public reputations to uphold, so we hope there are sufficient disincentives for any truly selfish voting.
Before applying a new governance system to a project like Optimism, it’s crucial to thoroughly examine and understand the various governance options available, along with their respective advantages and disadvantages.
In my opinion, the specific governance system is less important than understanding the evolving needs of the system over time. Since Optimism is still in its early stages, it’s more akin to an early-stage startup than a mature society. Therefore, it’s vital to consider our short-term, medium-term, and long-term goals and determine what type of governance structure will best enable Optimism to achieve those objectives.
For example, there are several pros and cons to consider when adopting a mechanism that allows any user to veto decisions in an early-stage company.
On the one hand, allowing users to veto decisions can provide a greater sense of transparency and inclusivity in decision-making. It allows users to feel like they have a voice in the development process and can help build trust between the company and its users.
However, there are also potential downsides to this approach. Allowing any user to veto a decision can create inefficiencies and slow down the decision-making process. It can also lead to paralysis by analysis, as decisions may be endlessly debated and delayed, ultimately preventing the company from making progress. Moreover, not all users may have the same level of technical knowledge and understanding of the company’s operations, which could lead to uninformed veto decisions that harm the company.
In summary, while allowing users to veto decisions can have some benefits, it may be more practical to limit this mechanism to a smaller group of qualified individuals who have a deeper understanding of the technology and can make informed decisions that benefit the company as a whole.
it … I am about to dive deep into old Roman literature and I find it fascinating.
there are sufficient disincentives for any truly selfish voting.