It may be the (correct) motivation, but this plan does little to enforce better outcomes when the gap is not in the allocation but in the distribution of OP
fwiw, I have thought at times that there was more OP being distributed than there was value being generated. My expectation is that this will change very soon
this is important part, because RPGF should continue, no matter decision on this proposal
considering burning, IMO it is still early to resonate on that, we are entering bull market, and things look good, as you pointed, projects even commented they got more than needed funds
but what would happen if $OP is $0.5 instead of current value, would that be the case as well?
can’t say that I disagree with proposal, but I don’t think that it is a priority at this point
agree
I support Polynya’s proposal to burn the surplus RetroPGF. I believe that greater op community attention should be allocated to the initiatives highlighted in Polynya’s proposal.
Hereinafter, I will refer to members of the Token House as “delegates” and members of the Citizen House as “Citizens”.
Currently, the governance structure of OP is realistically unicameral, but ideally, it will be bicameral in the future. The conflict in transitioning from a unicameral to a bicameral system will persist into the future.
In reality, OP’s system is unicameral. Delegates of the Token House are the decision-makers, responsible for approving financial budgets and delegating rights to numerous small committees. Citizens of the Citizen House are primarily public fiscal spenders. With a low degree of governance participation, their governance power is illusory. Currently, the most active members are delegates, with some serving dual roles as Citizens.
Historical experience suggests that transitioning to a bicameral system relies on two strong social classes. In Britain, both the nobility and the commoners were powerful, forming the basis for the transition to a bicameral system. Both are indispensable; however, when the power disparity is significant, attempting to use a bicameral system for mutual checks and balances only results in greater conflict and rupture, as seen in the French Revolution and China’s Xinhai Revolution.
The challenge in transitioning from a unicameral to a bicameral system lies in fostering a strong Citizen class. The complexity arises from Citizens having their own nationalities, with OP being just one of their many public chain/Layer2 options. Moreover, the incentives are asymmetric; while they benefit from OP’s public fiscal spending, they do not bear the cost of decision-making errors (the cost of OP inflation is borne by the Holders).**This leads to low governance participation among Citizens; without participation, there is insufficient knowledge and power.**When governance participation is unequal, a system of checks and balances between the two sides won’t solve the problem but instead will lead to greater conflicts and contradictions.
If Capture Resistance and Resource Allocation rely on a bicameral system (one representing the public spirit, the other representing realism interests), then expanding influence to attract organizations from past crypto public organizations and fostering a strong, decentralized crypto citizen class become the most challenging tasks.
The issue of RPGF being overly allocated is more than just a problem of disproportionate rewards/benefits.
In the current transition of OP from a unicameral to a bicameral system, and considering that OP still operates under a unicameral system, I advise against burdening Token Holders with excessive inflation costs. This would only lead to greater conflicts and contradictions, thereby jeopardizing the roadmap for a bicameral system.
I prefer Polynya’s approach: burning tokens from the budget surplus, exploring how to shift the Citizen class’s funding sources to protocol revenues and regular inflation, and gradually fostering a sustainable, decentralized crypto citizen class.