Hello! A few updates related to this comment/others here:
- I’ve entirely removed our ask for future alOP / self delegation. While it appears self delegation could be acceptable, it isn’t the primary reason we applied for the grant and it makes sense that a future use case could be addressed with a future grant.
- Looking at some other protocol asks, I’ve reduced the total ask from 750,000 to 500,000 (ie, the tokens that were being asked for for self delegation were completely removed, rather than reidistributed).
- I updated a few statistics here and there just to reflect the present day #delegate-updates
I do want to note that The “total requested based on current TVL” feels a bit backwards to me. Isn’t the point of OP grants to incentivize TVL and genuine defi activity on Optimism? I think our (reduced) ask is fair for these reasons:
- we have a proven use case on mainnet, being live for a year and a half, and the quality defi / low gas environment of optimism strengthens the use case without needing users to sacrifice their loyalty to ethereum
- We’ve explained that TVL is rather sticky so incentives are necessary to get people to migrate to try out Optimistic Alchemix
- Without an OP grant, users are less likely to use Optimistic Alchemix, as they could use another protocol that gives them OP incentives (which would then put Alchemix on uneven footing where our utility needs to overcome their straight financial incentive)
it’s a bit of a chicken & egg scenario, where we need a grant to prove we deserve the grant, but I believe the points above + the reduce total amount (from eliminating the delegated tokens) addresses the concerns. This also means we aren’t requesting dev or DAO funds - every OP token we get will go into the hands of those bringing TVL to Optimism through Alchemix / Alchemix partners.
For CVX/CRV bribes, it will be dependent on alAsset peg. As seen in the proposal it’s expected that the incentives bring more TVL to depositors than to liquidity (which is good, as that TVL is stickier). This also means that if we hit our TVL expectations, we will need more liquidity on Optimism. A clear sign of need would be either high TVL or lower alAsset peg on Optimism. Usually liquidity equivalent to half of TVL is sufficient / a good target.
So - if we meet our goal of >30m TVL, we’d need ~15m of liquidity. The incentives we have asked for in theory put us at 30m TVL, and 5m of liquidity. The liquidity comes from 250k OP tokens plus our VELO position. So we’d effectively need to provide another effective 500k+ of OP (in the form of ALCX) get up to the required liquidity. Which happens to be the grant we requested (that actually wasn’t intentional haha). So effectively, the way the proposal is set up is that we are providing the incentives to make Optimistic Alchemix feasible for launch, Optimism provides incentives start the growth, and then we can step in with more incentives to sustain the growth.
it’s a bit of a chicken & egg scenario, where we need a grant to prove we deserve the grant, but I believe the points above + the reduce total amount (from eliminating the delegated tokens) addresses the concerns.
I share this concern and think the focus always ought to be on evidence-backed expectation of growth unlocked by a grant – that is, what we think the grant catalyzes for the ecosystem-- rather than by existing TVL. One of the core purposes of the gov fund is to migrate protocols that have demonstrated PMF elsewhere, and Alchemix clearly fits this bill, even if it has yet to hit its ‘full’ numbers on Optimism.
This isn’t to say TVL isn’t irrelevant – it is a fine enough (but messy and manipulable) proxy for use, utility, and market acceptance – but there’s a risk in using it as a crutch as we have. Part of it is that it’s an easy thing to point to relative to other metrics, which is why we ought to be asking more from protocols in furnishing use data and perhaps pointing delegates to known resources on our end to help evaluate.
Thank you for the clarification. You make a solid case for Alchemix’s proposal and the adjustments you have made strengthens it. I encourage you to summarize the clarification for the CVX/CRV bribes in the original proposal post, as well as highlight changes that you have made throughout your proposal in the top (based on the feedback you received).
I am giving support for this proposal in its current form, both for Alchemix’s value going beyond simple DeFi primitives with its unique proposition as well as its proposal that is well revised to increase activity on Optimism.
Thank, you, done and done!
Not sure whether I need to do this again, but I’ve been asked to do so, just in case:
I am an Optimism delegate [Delegate Commitments - #136 by jackanorak ] with sufficient voting power and I believe this proposal is ready to move to a vote.
The defi shadow committee – which is not an official committee – supports this proposal.
We broadly support Alchemix’s proposal as written but advise halving their ask generally by time and size – there’s simply no good argument for running a grant past six months, and even that amount of time is a stretch.
They’re in the minority of proposals to date that have offered a bottom-up approach in outlining the size of their ask and explaining the additionality of the grant, and we’re inclined to agree with their view.
Another key piece is that Alchemix’s proposal is rare in that they are explicitly committing to move resources over to Optimism themselves — that is, they’re not just trying to draw users and capital, they’re moving the deployment of their own capital to encourage more use on Optimism. This goes beyond the simple idea of “incentive matching” — it’s a reflection that a grant can beget follow-on activity, and it’s exactly the kind of behavior we should be encouraging.
We think there is still some work to be done to determine KPIs, demonstrate migration from Mainnet, and discuss potential integrations with other ecosystem protocols, but these are nits in an otherwise well-presented proposal that seems advantageous for Optimism.
Defi Committee A Recommendation
Voting recommendation: No with caveat to resubmit
Rationale: We like the overall token distribution plan and value proposition. However, we would like to see the proposal resubmitted with the amount and distribution timeline split into 2 separate proposals. We would be happy to approve this proposal once these changes are made.
My interpretation of this request is that we would split it into 250k tokens for depositor incentives, and 250k tokens for liquidity incentives - is that accurate?
Additionally, can the split simply be a note in the proposal that the two 250k asks will be voted on separately, or you’d actually like us to split it out into two new forum posts?
Thanks!
We would like to see the distribution timeline and amount requested both reduced. The current ask is 500,000 over one year, so ideally we would like to see 250,000 over 6 months, so we can re-evaluate and make an additional grant based on performance metrics. Thank you for following up and please reach out if you have any additional questions.
Got it, so to verify - you are asking us to reduce the ask to 250k over 6 months for this proposal. Then, in 6 months, we can come back with another proposal for another 250k, or more, or less, if it makes sense to do so.
Yes, exactly. We can reassess after the 6 month timeline and evaluate effectiveness of the current token distribution plan.
Thank you for the feedback. I’ve made the suggested edits to the proposal to reflect 250k tokens over 6 months.
I believe it may be too late for these changes to be included in the current voting cycle. If that’s the case, we will be happy to support this proposal in the next voting cycle. Looping in @lavande for guidance
Since this proposal has received two delegate approvals, it may move to a vote in Cycle 7 as is.
Since approvals and committee recommendations were provided based on the proposal in its current form, and votes go to Snapshot today, I believe it is too late to make changes to the current proposal in this cycle.
The options would be to submit this proposal as is in Cycle 7 or to re-submit an updated proposal in Cycle 8.
Yes, I believe this proposal should go to Snapshot now in the same form in which it was originally submitted. @Ov3rkoalafied this means it could still be approved by delegate votes in its current form and you are welcome to reach out to delegates to solicit their support.
If it does not pass, you can resubmit to Cycle 8 with edits @Katie has suggested which sounds like it will earn their endorsement and will likely lead to easy approval then.
Voted no - Defi Committee A reasoning given here. I like this proposal overall but the team is going to adjust their amount requested and distribution timeline and resubmit for next cycle.
Sounds good to me. Do I need to do anything for it to proceed in that manner?
Hope to vote for this in the next voting cycle, if you follow committee’s recommendation this is a strong proposal otherwise.