[DRAFT] [GF: Phase 1 Proposal] Curve

“We discussed the possibility of doing this, and actually resembles my initial idea for distribution. We decided a fixed quantity per week is preferable for simplicity. It provides certainty about how long the incentive program will last, and it avoids added complexity (also possible inaccuracy) of requiring an oracle or assuming a hardcoded relative value. I’m hoping to reduce as much friction as possible with this proposal. It should be easy for anyone to understand where the OP is going, how much, for how long etc. But if you have an alternative suggestion to the 50k OP/week for 20 weeks, I’d be interested to hear it.”

Do you have a sense of (roughly) what the avg dollar value is of weekly CRV emissions currently being directed to Optimism pools? That might help us understand how the ratio of rewards ($ in OP: $ in CRV) would look as currently written.

Overall, I think it may still be worth considering adjusting the distribution mechanism to reflect (at least roughly) a 1:1 match of CRV emissions to OP emissions. This is the kind of thing that governance has pushed a lot protocol proposals on to ensure that the investment governance is making is being reciprocated.

If you were to make that adjustment, it would be added incentive for veCRV voters to vote for Optimism pools (increasing emissions flowing into the Optimism ecosystem) as they would know the value of the rewards flowing to LPs would be doubled over other pools (boosting Curve’s overall TVL and fee generation).

Since it sounds like bribes and fees will need to continue to flow to main-net for the time being, this would be a good way to show that this is about bringing more value to both Curve and Optimism versus being overly weighted one way or another.

Thanks for the proposal! Under the ‘Grant category:’ field, please specify which committee should review your proposal (NFTs and Gaming, Tooling, or DeFi).

Can you indicate exactly how much was requested from the Foundation Partner Fund?

And on what date have you applied?

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Curve is one of the best project so far in blockchain. It will add value to Optimism and will bring new users.

No amount specified, I submitted information for someone from Optimism to contact Curve team and/or Discord support. To my knowledge, no one has gotten back to them yet. That was probably around mid-August.

Hi @WormholeOracle Have you thought about deadlock ? Foundation might be waiting to see how this proposal is doing and you/we are waiting for foundation response. I would have loved to support this proposal in current form but even after my multiple request you did not summarize the feedback or asked for support from other delegates.
I am not gonna jump to conclusion but this lack of engagement from Curve side does bring my confidence down in your proposal.

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How will protocols with no veCRV positions to create gauges benefit from this grant?

25,000 OP/week for LPs is a lot. What percentage of incentives is Curve to match in CRV?

What is the Curve roadmap on Optimism?

How we avoid the fate of Curve on Fantom and Avalanche?

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Feedback summary is at the bottom of the proposal, as you requested, or did I misunderstand where feedback should be posted? I’m trying to navigate my way around Optimism’s governance process, but the expectations have been changing and I’m doing my best to keep up with it. I didn’t know I needed to solicit other delegates, or the best way to contact them?

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You asked the right questions; thank you mate. :+1:

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Curve is a great project but we shouldn’t be beclouded by that and not ask the right question(s) as to how ‘‘it’’ proposal will meaningfully aid the Optimism ecosystem. 1,000,000 $OP is a lot.

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To follow up here, the most recent Governance Update suggests the following:

It is not the intended purpose of the governance fund to retroactively fund public goods without an expectation of future work

What is the future work Curve is committing to?

To the extent that Ethereum has legitimate usage on L1, we should seek to migrate that usage to Optimism.

Can we expect to Curve to migrate governance, fees, and bribing capabilities to Optimism?

It would be helpful if someone from the foundation could update the status of the Curve proposal. @bobby @vonnie610 ?

You dont need veCRV to create a gauge. Anyone is welcome to create a proposal for a gauge that receives CRV emissions at gov.curve.fi. Protocols that have demonstrated a good track record and demand for their product generally have a good shot a passing a vote, even if they have no veCRV position.

25k/week, to be clear, is the total split between all gauged pools. Curve matches incentives based on veCRV gauge weighting, which is decentralized and therefore I’m unable to give a concrete percentage. If Optimism becomes the dominant network for liquidity and trading, gauge weighting will likely shift toward Optimism, and CRV emissions last for hundreds of years. We are in the bootstrapping phase now to draw initial liquidity.

I am not a Curve team member, so I can’t answer that authoritatively. What I believe personally is that liquidity should shift toward L2’s to achieve scalability. This article by Delphi Digital shows how Curve would be much more competitive in a low gas fee environment. Also, L2’s also make more dense metapools viable, for example a [tricrypto, 3pool] pool (ETH, BTC, USDT, USDC, DAI), which is too gas intensive for mainnet.

From what I see, the “fate of Fantom and Avalanche” was that these were alt L1’s that were uber-hyped during a bull market that favored the Ethereum killer narrative, and when I look at charts of TVL for other DeFi apps on those networks, it’s the same story. Avoiding the same fate really comes down to building a network that is resilient and scalable where people feel comfortable keeping most of their money. Again, my personal opinion is the L2’s are better positioned to become the dominant application layer after all the hype cycles.

I’m not sure that your quote from the Governance Update applies to this situation. I would think that applies if a proposer is requesting compensation for a public good they’ve created for Optimism. Curve is also a public good, but the proposal is not requesting compensation to Curve for their work. This is entirely being passed onto LP’s, who are Optimism’s user base, many of whom are in this thread and who will directly benefit from an incentive program. Again, not a Curve team member, but I know Curve has plans to add features to Optimism in the future. That includes a V2 pool factory and CRV LP boosting capability.

Migrating core governance probably wont be on the table for the forseeable future for security reasons. What I imagine could be possible in the medium term as cross chain interoperability improves, a user’s voter power could be read from main net and used to allocate fees and bribes directly on Optimism. Curve is limited currently by the rudimentary tools available to access data across chains, which is a big pain point for all of DeFi right now.

I’ve been informed that I missed cycle 6 because there need to be two delegates that verbalize support for the proposal before it goes to vote. So I have edited the title to [DRAFT] and specified this is for cycle #7.

I’ve worked hard and long to write, revise, and engage with this proposal process, I would love it if delegates would be willing to offer their support to bring this to a vote. If you’re willing to offer support conditionally, let me know what you need to see first and I’m happy to work it out with you.

I’m only being diligent about this proposal because I believe this is a good deal for both Optimism and Curve. If I thought it was value extractive and only benefits Curve, I wouldn’t even bother with it. This OP is 100% going back to Optimism users and seeks to bootstrap liquidity and trade activity on Optimism.


I appreciate your proposal for the full information. Please update your proposal according to this template, and the information that you are applying for cycle #7 is indicated in the proposal description, not in the title, (see template).
And probably the proposal is applicable for the DeFi committee.

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Thank you for the replies @WormholeOracle. For the next version of the proposal, I would suggest either finding a way to bring further details or commitments around co-incentives (or other investments into Optimism) or significantly lowering the initial ask.

It might also help to review a few other protocol’s successful proposals and the discussion around them. Generally speaking, governance has insisted on more details on co-incentives than is currently being offered in this proposal. I understand why that might be challenging given Curve’s design, but it seems critical given the size of the ask.

Just as one example, here was the passed proposal from Balancer & Beethoven.

Hi @OPGovWatch If you are more agreeable to it, I would revise the distribution to instead be used to bribe gauge weighting from veCRV. That would alleviate your concern on co-incentives, as you can get expect >$1 emissions per $1 of bribe. It is commonly cited as the more efficient method of attracting TVL, and is the strategy proposed in Balancer’s proposal. If this strategy provides greater assurance to Optimism that both parties will carry their weight, I will propose to evenly split the weekly distribution on bribes between all gauged pools on Optimism. How does that sound to you?

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An interesting idea! Is bribing with OP possible on Curve? I do not believe it can be bridged.

Curve is a great project!

Yeah, so you might like this! I’m speaking with Votium team, they say they can setup deposit and claim contracts on Optimism, and they generate a merkle proof for voter distribution. Voters can then claim OP directly from Optimism