“We discussed the possibility of doing this, and actually resembles my initial idea for distribution. We decided a fixed quantity per week is preferable for simplicity. It provides certainty about how long the incentive program will last, and it avoids added complexity (also possible inaccuracy) of requiring an oracle or assuming a hardcoded relative value. I’m hoping to reduce as much friction as possible with this proposal. It should be easy for anyone to understand where the OP is going, how much, for how long etc. But if you have an alternative suggestion to the 50k OP/week for 20 weeks, I’d be interested to hear it.”
Do you have a sense of (roughly) what the avg dollar value is of weekly CRV emissions currently being directed to Optimism pools? That might help us understand how the ratio of rewards ($ in OP: $ in CRV) would look as currently written.
Overall, I think it may still be worth considering adjusting the distribution mechanism to reflect (at least roughly) a 1:1 match of CRV emissions to OP emissions. This is the kind of thing that governance has pushed a lot protocol proposals on to ensure that the investment governance is making is being reciprocated.
If you were to make that adjustment, it would be added incentive for veCRV voters to vote for Optimism pools (increasing emissions flowing into the Optimism ecosystem) as they would know the value of the rewards flowing to LPs would be doubled over other pools (boosting Curve’s overall TVL and fee generation).
Since it sounds like bribes and fees will need to continue to flow to main-net for the time being, this would be a good way to show that this is about bringing more value to both Curve and Optimism versus being overly weighted one way or another.