Curve is a great project but we shouldn’t be beclouded by that and not ask the right question(s) as to how ‘‘it’’ proposal will meaningfully aid the Optimism ecosystem. 1,000,000 $OP is a lot.
To follow up here, the most recent Governance Update suggests the following:
It is not the intended purpose of the governance fund to retroactively fund public goods without an expectation of future work
What is the future work Curve is committing to?
To the extent that Ethereum has legitimate usage on L1, we should seek to migrate that usage to Optimism.
Can we expect to Curve to migrate governance, fees, and bribing capabilities to Optimism?
You dont need veCRV to create a gauge. Anyone is welcome to create a proposal for a gauge that receives CRV emissions at gov.curve.fi. Protocols that have demonstrated a good track record and demand for their product generally have a good shot a passing a vote, even if they have no veCRV position.
25k/week, to be clear, is the total split between all gauged pools. Curve matches incentives based on veCRV gauge weighting, which is decentralized and therefore I’m unable to give a concrete percentage. If Optimism becomes the dominant network for liquidity and trading, gauge weighting will likely shift toward Optimism, and CRV emissions last for hundreds of years. We are in the bootstrapping phase now to draw initial liquidity.
I am not a Curve team member, so I can’t answer that authoritatively. What I believe personally is that liquidity should shift toward L2’s to achieve scalability. This article by Delphi Digital shows how Curve would be much more competitive in a low gas fee environment. Also, L2’s also make more dense metapools viable, for example a [tricrypto, 3pool] pool (ETH, BTC, USDT, USDC, DAI), which is too gas intensive for mainnet.
From what I see, the “fate of Fantom and Avalanche” was that these were alt L1’s that were uber-hyped during a bull market that favored the Ethereum killer narrative, and when I look at charts of TVL for other DeFi apps on those networks, it’s the same story. Avoiding the same fate really comes down to building a network that is resilient and scalable where people feel comfortable keeping most of their money. Again, my personal opinion is the L2’s are better positioned to become the dominant application layer after all the hype cycles.
I’m not sure that your quote from the Governance Update applies to this situation. I would think that applies if a proposer is requesting compensation for a public good they’ve created for Optimism. Curve is also a public good, but the proposal is not requesting compensation to Curve for their work. This is entirely being passed onto LP’s, who are Optimism’s user base, many of whom are in this thread and who will directly benefit from an incentive program. Again, not a Curve team member, but I know Curve has plans to add features to Optimism in the future. That includes a V2 pool factory and CRV LP boosting capability.
Migrating core governance probably wont be on the table for the forseeable future for security reasons. What I imagine could be possible in the medium term as cross chain interoperability improves, a user’s voter power could be read from main net and used to allocate fees and bribes directly on Optimism. Curve is limited currently by the rudimentary tools available to access data across chains, which is a big pain point for all of DeFi right now.
I’ve been informed that I missed cycle 6 because there need to be two delegates that verbalize support for the proposal before it goes to vote. So I have edited the title to [DRAFT] and specified this is for cycle #7.
I’ve worked hard and long to write, revise, and engage with this proposal process, I would love it if delegates would be willing to offer their support to bring this to a vote. If you’re willing to offer support conditionally, let me know what you need to see first and I’m happy to work it out with you.
I’m only being diligent about this proposal because I believe this is a good deal for both Optimism and Curve. If I thought it was value extractive and only benefits Curve, I wouldn’t even bother with it. This OP is 100% going back to Optimism users and seeks to bootstrap liquidity and trade activity on Optimism.
I appreciate your proposal for the full information. Please update your proposal according to this template, and the information that you are applying for cycle #7 is indicated in the proposal description, not in the title, (see template).
And probably the proposal is applicable for the DeFi committee.
Thank you for the replies @WormholeOracle. For the next version of the proposal, I would suggest either finding a way to bring further details or commitments around co-incentives (or other investments into Optimism) or significantly lowering the initial ask.
It might also help to review a few other protocol’s successful proposals and the discussion around them. Generally speaking, governance has insisted on more details on co-incentives than is currently being offered in this proposal. I understand why that might be challenging given Curve’s design, but it seems critical given the size of the ask.
Just as one example, here was the passed proposal from Balancer & Beethoven.
Hi @OPGovWatch If you are more agreeable to it, I would revise the distribution to instead be used to bribe gauge weighting from veCRV. That would alleviate your concern on co-incentives, as you can get expect >$1 emissions per $1 of bribe. It is commonly cited as the more efficient method of attracting TVL, and is the strategy proposed in Balancer’s proposal. If this strategy provides greater assurance to Optimism that both parties will carry their weight, I will propose to evenly split the weekly distribution on bribes between all gauged pools on Optimism. How does that sound to you?
An interesting idea! Is bribing with OP possible on Curve? I do not believe it can be bridged.
Curve is a great project!
Yeah, so you might like this! I’m speaking with Votium team, they say they can setup deposit and claim contracts on Optimism, and they generate a merkle proof for voter distribution. Voters can then claim OP directly from Optimism
I think this would represent a substantial improvement on the proposal if it can be implemented! Though I might still suggest the overall ask be brought to something more in line with the Balancer / Beethoven grant.
Both are very different. One has more use in the market, its use is bigger.
You are correct.
However, if you look at the proposals that have passed most recently you will see that a 1,000,000 OP is an extremely high ask especially for LP incentives which have often been contentious. I think a lower ask would make it more likely the proposal will receive delegate endorsements and committee approvals.
Please review updated proposal, which changes distribution from liquidity mining to vote incentives, and reduces requested OP.
Thank you. I am reviewing now.
Would it be possible to add an Optimism gauge for a TriCrypto pool and ensure it is bribed as well? That would benefit the whole ecosystem.
How would these incentives appear within Votium? Would they appear as bribes? Would their auto-vote optimizer distribute votes accordingly?
Yes Tricrypto pool is going to be deployed soon, which I’m sure will quickly be followed by gauge vote, so will be eligible to receive bribes.
Incentives appear as rewards in Votium for voting on a specific gauge. Votium has two services, one pays to CVX and the other to veCRV. They have tens of millions of CVX delegated to them, so would auto optimize votes with CVX. But veCRV there is no delegation, so voters would have to actively vote. OTOH, bribes are more crowded on CVX, so it’s possible you get a better deal going with veCRV. I don’t have a strong preference for one or the other, sounds like maybe Votium’s auto optimizer is more appealing to you?
Hi @OPUser, @MinimalGravitas, @katie: I’m not asking for officially Sponsorship or approval of proposal but I just need verbal delegate support so that my proposal can get proper committee review for cycle-7. Thank you
I am an Optimism delegate [Delegate Commitments - #65 by mastermojo ] with sufficient voting power, and I believe this proposal is ready to move to a vote.
Remember the Synthetix Ambassadors are Delegates too.