Appreciate the clarifications earlier. Now that weāve settled questions about process, Iāll turn to the individual qās you posted earlier, as theyāre similar to the open questions we laid out in the original proposal. There is enough overlap where Iād rather post them here, and then once weāve discussed, we can amend.
Excited to get back to the proposal at hand.
Who will own the LP address, OP foundation ? or someone else ? This need clear answer.
Foundation multisig is probably the most low-friction way to custody this while final governance is sorted out.
What would you suggest to do with the LP rewards. Give some of your suggestion ?
In our initial proposal, we left this an open question and invited thoughts. The three primary actions are:
- Sell LP rewards to compound LP positions, possibly through autocompounder
- Compound LP rewards into more capacity to influence broader liquidity
ā if v3, possibly buy back OP for more public good distribution or acquire votepower in a veDEX
ā if veDEX model, such as Velo or Curve, accumulate voting tokens to gain general votepower
- Sell LP rewards for some other purpose
āBuy back OP for public good investment
āAcquire more governance of partner protocols
ā(pending legal clearance, lol) general treasury mgmt
As you can see, there are a few different paths, but each of them presents an interesting opportunity for the Collective.
My personal suggestion would be some combination of compounding voteshare and buying back OP, both of which directly free up Governanceās hand to facilitate more funding, but this is very much an area where Iād invite some other perspectives.
How long will this LP last ? Who will make a call do dilute the LP and /or its rewards.
Our thinking was that this would be more or less permanent until the protocol signaled a lack of need, at which point the funds would be at Optimismās disposal. We could say that Optimism commits to holding protocolsā governance tokens in perpetuity while reclaiming its OP for more public goods distribution.
Do you see Impermanent loss as a problem? What would you recommend to mitigate this ?
As an impediment to passing this proposal, no. The analogy I used above is that itās silly to refuse to accept $100 of free money because youāre worried you might lose $10 of that.
The primary reason for doing this in the first place is to take OP you were already going to give away and put it to work for the same purpose it was originally being requested forābut also put it to work for you. How efficiently it works for you is secondary because your alternative is getting 0 value for yourself.
As an operating matter, yes there are possibilities to mitigate this, but I believe itās downstream of getting something like this passed.
How this will work ? Lets say OP foundation has the token owned by multi-sig, now who will vote and participate in the DAO ? will it be foundation or the delegates?
This is a super exciting area where I donāt have a clear direction! I think this is a much, much bigger question on which I would be thrilled to have this proposal spark discussion.
Fortunately, even if this passed we would have some time to sort it out. Of primary importance is meeting protocolsā liquidity needs, which currently represent over 1/3 of all approved OP distributions.